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Requirements for the Degree of 
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PREFACE 
/ 
The original idea for this book was conceived in the winter 
of 1952. I had consulted Richard.McKeon, my advisor in the 
philosophy department at the University of Chicago, about my 
forthcoming Master's dissertation. He, knowing my particular 
religious background, suggested that I aim eventually at attempt-
ing to state Luther's philosophic position and that my ~fuster's 
work be a preliminary for it. As nearly as I can summarize his 
remarks he said, "Luther needs to be looked at from a philoso-
pher's standpoint. I think there is a fresh viewpoint there 
which has been hidden under the debris of the past few centuries. 
So far as I know, no one, at least rec~ntly, has tried to get at 
the philosophic Luther. The trouble with him is that everything 
he wrote is wordy. You have to dig through a lot of rhetoric to 
get at his thought. He's a very unsystematic fellow. The most 
fruitful place to look will probably be his De Servo Arbitrio. 
Fourteen years later, I took up the task in earnest. 
Whether what f ollov7s satisfies the deroands of the task laid down 
a decade and a half ago, I am not in a position to judge. If it 
does, much of the credit belongs to Richard McKeon, who not only 
set the task, but, to a great extent equipped me intellectually 
to undertake it. If it fails to meet the demands of the task, 
the fault is mine. 
The claim has often been made that Luther was opposed to 
iii 
philosophy. Certainly there are passages in his writings which 
can be cited to support such a position. . "Philoso~y is the 
theology of heathen and of rationalists. 111 Philosophy is "a 
study of futility and perdition. • • • • Do not attempt to sup-
port and defend philosophy; rather study it as we study evil arts 
and mistaken positions, to destroy and to refute them. 112 
Luther's sharpest criticisms are reserved for Aristotle. "I 
am heartsick that this damned, cocky mischievous heathen has 
deluded and fooled so many of the best Christians with his false 
ideas. He has been sent as a plague to God because of our sins. 
• • • • His book on ethics is the worst of all books. • • • • 
Away with such books. Keep them away from Christians. • • • • 
I have lectured and heard lectures on him, and I understand him 
better than did St. Thomas or Scotus.••3 
Twelve years later, on the other hand, Luther told a friend, 
Veit Dietrich, 11Aristotle is very good in the area of moral 
philosophy. 114 
Cicero is frequently praised by Luther. 11 If anyone wants 
1n. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe 
(Weimarer Ausgabe), ~ischreden V, tr. A. Freitag, Weimar: Herman 
B8hlaUs Nachfolger, 1908, no.· 5557. Subsequent references to the 
Weimar edition will be noted as "WA", followed by volume number 
in Roman Numerals and page reference or item citation in arabic. 
2
commentary £n St. Paul's Epistle!£ the Romans, 
WA LVI, p. 372. 
3Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation 
~the Reform of the Christian Estate, WA VI-,-p:-458. 
4wA, Tischreden I, no. 411. 
--· 
iv 
real philosophy he ought to read Cicero." 5 "Cicero was an 
excellent philosopher; ••• • I hope our Lord God will be 
. . / 
gracious to him and his kind ••• 
• Finally, "Cicero wrote and 
taught brilliantly about virtues, prudence and other matters; 
likewise Aristotle about ethics, brilliantly and learnedly. The 
books of both are certainly very useful and very necessary for 
the conduct of this life. 117 
How can these seemingly contradictory remarks be reconciled? 
Luther's criticism of philosophy is not a criticism of the philo-
sophie discipline itself, but of the attempt to use philosophy as 
a substitute for theology. "He must carefully distinguish be-
8 tween philosophy and theology." "Aristotle depicts for us a 
god of this sort: who is sleeping and permits anyone to use or 
abuse his longsuffering and chastening at will." 9 Rational dis-
covery and Christian revelation are mutually exclusive. The need 
for both theology and philosophy in the discovery of truth is not 
thereby excluded. 'Hhile for Luther philosophy cannot discover 
the way to God or provide the truth about Him and the human con-
dition relative to Him, it is necessary for the conduct of this 
5wA Tischreden II, no. 2412b. 
6
r.,.JA Tischreden III, nos. 3904, 3925. 
7
corn.rnentary on Chapter Nine of Isaiah, vlA XXXX, III, 
p. 608. 
8 Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle !Q the Galatians, 
WA XXXX, I, p. 410. 
9
on Bound Choice, WA XVIII, p. 706. 
1 . f 10 present 1 e. 
v 
My suspicion that there could be found in·Luth7r's writings 
at least the rudiments of a philosophic position was aroused by 
the fact that in the De Servo Arbitrio, there are found a number 
of philosophic questions, issues raised by Erasmus, to which 
Luther gives philosophic ansHers. He argues on philosophic 
grounds to a given position, makes philosophic distinctions, opts 
for a particular philosophic position to the exclusion of others, 
and proceeds dialectically in his examination of materials. 
Both he and Erasmus purport to be arguing their respective 
cases on "scripture alone". Yet, Hhen they divide on the meaning 
and import of a particular passage, of necessity they move beyond 
"scripture alone" to grarnmatical analys·is to get at the meaning, 
and philosophical analysis to get at the import of the passage or 
to expose fallacies in the other's reasoning or assumptions. 
A philosophical debate, however, might yield only bits and 
pieces which, interesting as they might be historically, would 
have little if any philosophic value, since they could not be 
linked up into a coherent body of thought, the implications of 
which might profitably be developed. 
The next clue to Luther's thinking was provided by his 
insistence on describing divine activity in terms of liberum 
10
see citation 7. Cicero and Aristotle are "necessary 
for the conduct of this life." 
b . i 11 ar ~tr urn. 
vi 
That kind of approach had its precedents in Scotus, 
Ockham and Biel. The tradition of the latter two had shaped 
/ 
Luther's educational experiences. Contrary to that tradition, 
however, Luther argues that divine liberum arbitrium excludes the 
possibility of human liberum arbitrium. An analysis of this con-
cept of liberum arbitrium, distinguishing the characteristics 
entailed by it, and what it implied about the nature of human 
action as affected by it led to the isolation and relating of the 
materials found in Part A of Chapter II. 
From an ethical standpoint, then, Luther had presented a 
philosophic explanation for the existence of goodness, namely, 
the activity of an entity exercising liberum arbitrium. But 
what about the existence of evil? The available material in 
Luther was scanty, but adequate to the task. It necessitated to 
some extent going outside the De Servo Arbitrio. These materials 
are found in the latter portion of Chapter II. What they revea 1 
is three additional kinds of activity within the over-riding 
activity of divine liberum arbitrium, Satanic opposition (a 
principle of destruction), divine'recreative activity (reconcil-
ing the opposition back into conformity to the divine intent) and 
11 1 have used the expression liberum arbitrium as a 
technical expression, usually untranslated, since it would often 
appear clumsy or artificial in English translation and sometimes 
would be confused with voluntas. 
vii 
human existential activity. 
With respect to the last activity, the problem with which I 
/ 
wrestled for some time was this: if, as Luther claims, everything 
can be explained in terms of ontological determination by divine 
free activity, how is it possible for man to exercise choice over 
11 the things which are beneath him", a claim which Luther also 
makes? 12 
The problem was resolved by isolating what it is in human 
action which is accounted for by the first three kinds of activ•~ 
ity. Whatever was left over is the uniquely human contribution. 
The first activity accounts for man's being. The second and 
third account for his inner impulses to action, his urges and 
adventitious ideas. What is left is the capacity to deliberate 
over these urges and ideas prior to action. 
The four kinds of activities resolve themselves into a three 
level hierarchy of relationships to which I gave the names: 
. 
ontological, manichaean and existential. What was necessary next 
was to test the hierarchy for consistency. Since it was a hier-
archy of activities, as opposed, for instance, to a hierarchy .of: 
ideas, the problem reduced to justifying the activities in re-
lation to one another. This.task occupies Chapter III. 
Finally, I moved beyond the structure which had been created 
to an examination of what it implied about the nature of human 
12
see quotation 34 and footnote 36 of Chapter lJ.. 
viii 
action, to the question of the relation between inner motivation 
(quite literally "being moved") and outer action. Chapter IV 
/ 
exhibits the results of that examination. Given then that 
explanation of human action, it was a simple task to exhibit the 
nature of human ethical problems and the approach to ethics which 
follows from it. 
Briefly, then, this recapitulates the process of analysis 
of which the chapters which follow are a synthesis. 1 have 
attempted to set forth as simply and, at the same time, in as 
organized a fashion as 1 could, the philosophic foundation of 
Luther's ethics. Consequently, 1 have tried to keep to a minimum 
commentary on his words, letting them speak for themselves as 
much as possible. Occasionally 1 have departed from this resolve 
to comment in a footnote on a point which 1 thought was interest-
ing in the light of subsequent philosophic history. Needless to 
say, much more could have been said. 
The first chapter provides Luther's educational background, 
functioning as an intellectual frame to set off the image within 
it. Chapter 11 is largely an effort to sort out the pieces of 
Luther's thought and to connect them to one another in a coherent 
whole. Where a logical argument is lacking to relate the ideas, 
1 have supplied what 1 felt was appropriate. The task, in a 
sense, was similar to that of an art restorer, attempting to fit 
together the bits and pieces of a statue long ago shattered. 
Sometimes, where there ia a piece missing, he must fashion a 
,. 
ix 
substitute piece. Hopefully, my little pieces of plaster of 
Paris blend with Luther's marble. Fortunately, there are not 
/ 
many of them. I have indicated where they occur. 
Chapter Ill functions as the test for consistency of the 
thought structure which emerges after all the pieces of Luther's 
thought had been put together. The test items were developed by 
Erasmus; the responses by Luther. 
Chapter IV initiates a departure from the explicit expres-
sion of Luther's thought to -the implications of his position. I 
use a distinction for which he is famous, law/gospel, and apply 
it to the entire structure of his thought. The result exhibits 
the possible directions in which his thought can be extended, 
only a few of which he himself developed in print. His pro-
fessional career was devoted almost exclusively to exploring what 
I have labeled the manichaean level of activity. 
The final chapter exhibits Luther's approach in contrast to 
three other kinds of approaches to action. Apart from the 
reasons stated in the text for handling the matter in this fash-
ion, 1 felt that it was necessary some,.,rhere in these pages to 
exhibit structural incompatibilities with other kinds of philo-
sophie approaches, particularly since Luther's approach has been 
confused at times by Lutherans with at least two of the contrast-
ing approaches. For instance, after Luther's death Melanchthon 
became the leading Lutheran theologian. Nelanchthon by that time 
had become a thorougheoing Aristotelian and, unconsciously I am 
X 
sure, attempted to formulate Luther's thought teleologically. 
Again, for a variety of reasons, usually non-7heological, 
Lutherans and Calvinists have often found themselves in a common 
camp, first in Europe and later in America. The Calvinistic 
approach is essentially deontic. The subtle effect of this 
association with European Calvinism and American Puritanism has 
tended to modify the original Lutheran approach. Part of the 
task of isolating Luther's philosophic approach, as a result, has 
been to remove the Calvinist-ic deontic patina and, beneath that 
the Melanchthonian telic patina, in order that the original metal 
shaped by Luther can be exposed and examined on its own merits. 
Except where indicated the translations are mine. I have 
used the Weimar Edition of Luther wherever possible. My second 
critical resource has been the St. Louis German Edition. The 
primary text for Luther's position has been his De Servo 
Arbitrio. I have gone outside that work only where necessary to 
supplement or to clarify ideas that work contains. 
Several passages from Helanchthon's Loci Communes of 1521, 
are cited as Luther's position because Luther himself in the 
De Servo Arbitrio gave that book his highest praise and unquali-
fied approval. I have also quoted upon occasion from the con-
fessional documents of the Lutheran Church, but only such 
documents as Luther is known to have read and approved. These 
quotations from sources outside Luther constitute only a minor 
portion of the material on which the book is based. 
xi 
1 am indebted to Nr. Robert Coburn of the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Chicago for the technique of the 
. / 
antilogism used in Chapter tiL The second antilogism in that 
chapter was developed in another context while 1 was working as a 
student under him about nine years ago. 
Finally, 1 am indebted to Dr. F. Torrens Hecht S.J., former 
chairman of the Philosophy Department of Loyola University, for 
encouraging me in this undertaking and for making my work 
possible, and to Dr. Francis· Catania, the present chairman, who 
suggested the possibility of a wider readership than 1 envisioned 
and gently guided me in that direction, pointing out and helping 
me to remove the philosophic boulders which stood in the way of 
completing the task. 
P· 
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Religion deals existentially with the meaning 
of being; philosophy deals theoretically with 
the structure of being. But religion can ex-
press itself only through the ontological 
elements and categories with which philosophy 
deals, while philosophy can discover the 
structure of being only to the degree to 
which being-itself has become manifest in an 
existential experience. 
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1 
CHAPTER I 
~ SETTING OF LUTHER'S THOUGHT / 
Martin Luther's reputation as a great thinker in the tra-
dition of the western world rests largely on his contributions to 
theology and his effect on political affairs. He is not noted as 
a philosopher; certainly he did not found a new school of philos-
ophy as did Descartes or Kant. Yet, one can with profit examine 
Luther the Philosopher in contrast to Luther the Theologian, 
Luther the Politician and Luther the Educator, even as one can 
profitably study in similar contrast Augustine the Philosopher or 
Thomas Aquinas the Philosopher. 
The great churchmen, beginning with Augustine, were both 
philosophers and theologians. Augustine and Aquinas never pro-
duced a system of philos.ophy, collected in one or a set of 
volumes in clear logical order; so also Luther, though he wrote 
much on many topics, never gathered the body of his thought in a 
simple distillate of philosophic concentration to give order and 
integrity to the vast range of his thought. Yet, the foundations 
are there, the germinal ideas scattered liberally in his writings, 
waiting to be gathered up and arranged in systematic order. 
Luther did not fancy himself a philosopher. Though a 
lecturer in philosophy for a time at Erfurt and Wittenberg, he 
preferred the rich contents of theology to the formal structures 
which passed for philosophy in his. day. He wanted to feast .on 
~~--~------------------------~------~---------, 
2 
the meat of theology; let someone else gnaw on the bones of 
philosophy. Yet, for all that, he was philosophic, an original 
/ 
thinker, laying out for himself a new pathway of thought in an 
age struggling out of the middle ~ges into the modern. He gained 
no philosophic disciples. Those who followed him in thought 
followed for theological or political reasons. And when he died 
his philosophic insights were lost sight of--if they had ever 
been seen--so that when German philosophy rose to the ascendancy 
in Europe a century later, it was a different kind of philosophy 
which-was produced by the Lutherans, Leibniz, Wolff and Kant. 
Yet Luther's philosophic thought has survived, buried in his 
theology, unnoticed and unheeded, waiting to be separated out so 
it can be organized and expanded. The .living body of his theology, 
still practiced and believed, retains within itself the skeleton 
of his philosophic thought. 
There have been attempts ever and again to formulate 
Luther's ethic and politic--a relatively easy task since he wrote 
so copiously on both subjects--yet these are but the outcomes of 
his philosophic thought, not the foundations. They describe the 
steps which a person rightly takes, the actions which he properly 
performs, but they are not meaningful until one first has identi-
fied the person and isolated the spirit which shapes the actions, 
causes the steps and gives them meaning--as Luther was always wont 
to insist. Thus, one inevitably must get back to Luther the 
Philosopher to understand Luther the Theologian, Luther the 
pt 
3 
Ethicist and Politician and, what is more significant today, to 
understand the genius of Lutheranism which distinguishes it from 
/ 
the genius of Catholicism or Calvinism. To understand Lutheran-
ism one must read the mind of Luther, for Lutheranism has, by and 
large, remained faithful to him and his thought has survived 450 
eventful years in surprisingly vital fashion. Calvin has grown 
archaic; he has not worn well. But Luther is still alive. Yet, 
Luther the Philosopher remains relatively unknown and unrecog-
nized. 
The reasons for the lack of recognition of the philosophic 
side of Luther are many. Luther, if he thought of himself as 
anything, thought of himself as a Bible interpreter and preacher, 
not a philosopher. The theological curriculum of his day was 
structured in such a way that the epitome of scholarly attainment 
the Doctor of Divinity degree, entitled one officially to comment 
independently on Scripture itself. Prior to that attainment one 
made his scholarly contributions within the relatively safe 
confines of the Sentences. 1 One noted the insights implicit in 
1The Four Books of Sentences was compiled by Peter 
Lombard (c 1100:rr60764). -rt was probably the most influential 
book in education and in the development of philosophical and 
theological thought from the thirteenth to the sixteenth cen-
turies. According to Richard McKeon it was virtually the center 
of the university curriculum by the middle of the thirteenth 
century. Selections from Medieval Philosophers, I, ed. & tr. 
Richard McKeon, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 185. 
The four books cover the chief problems of theology according to 
the following structure. The question is introduce~ after which 
pertinent scripture passages are cited, followed by quotations 
p. 
4 
the compendium of great men's ideas about the fundamental issues 
of mankind. But the Doctor of Divinity interpreted the thoughts 
/ 
of God to his fellowmen. Luther attained that degree and devoted 
himself assiduously to that task both by way of commentary, 
translation, and sermon. 2 The bulk of his academic output: 
from the church fathers and more recent theologians on the topic. 
Lombard did not attempt to reconcile apparent contradictions in 
the authorities cited. The book is a handy compendium of the 
best thinking in the church to his time on the topics treated. 
Some of the leading theologians in the medieval church after his 
time wrote commentaries on the Sentences. See also Stanley J. 
Curtis, "Peter Lombard, a Pioneer in Educa tiona 1 Method", 
Miscellanea Lombardiana, Novara, 1957, pp. 265-273. A new 
critical edition of the ~ of Sentences will be published 
shortly by Quaracchi in Florence, Italy. 
2Luther received the Doctorate in Divinity on October 
19, 1512 from Wittenberg University. On the 22nd he was inducted 
into office as a member of the Theological Faculty. On the 25th 
be began a series of lectures on Genesis (1512-1513). He lec-
tured on the Psalms (1513-1515), Romans (1515-1516), Galatians 
(1516-1517) and Hebrews (1517-1518). He was involved with 
matters having to do with his public protest against indulgence 
sales for several years. When he returned to the classroom he 
began exegetical lectures again. Between 1512 and 1546 he 
delivered a series of sixteen lectures on 13 books of the Bible. 
He translated the Bible from Hebrew and Greek into vernacula.r 
German for the benefit of his countrymen. Beginning in 1514 he 
preached frequently, first at Wittenberg as chaplain to the 
university and the community, and later in many parts of Germany. 
His early lectures exhibit great dependence on traditional 
commentaries and follow typical methods of exposition followed at 
his time. Later lectures, beginning with those on Romans, are 
freer and exhibit an approach which depends on grammatical 
analysis of the original language of the texts and interprets the 
text in a literal fashion (thereby departing from the traditional 
four-fold manner of interpretation: literal, allegorical, tropo-
logical and anagogical). For an extend~d treatment of Luther's 
early lectures see Mackinnon, James, Luther and the Reformation, 
I, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1925, chapters V and VI, and 
Schwiebert, E. G., Luther and~ times, St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950, chapter 9. 
P'· 
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commentaries, sermons, the translation of the Old and New Testa-
ment, flow from that function. And yet, near the end of his life 
/ 
he valued most highly of all that he had produced, the ~ Servo 
Arbitrio, the most philosophic of his works. 3 
Much of his formal education was shaped in the ~ moderna 
tradition of Ockham and Biel.4 And, though he departed from them 
3In 1537 Luther wrote to Wolfgang Capito who wished to 
publish Luther's complete works, that he did not care what 
happened to his books. The only works with which he was satis-
fied were his De Servo Arbitrio and his catechism. WA Briefe 
VIII, no. 3162:- . 
4The ill moderna, a name espoused by the nomina lists, 
Ockham, Biel and others, to distinguish themselves from the 
realistic tradition of Thomas and his disciples which they called 
the ill antigua, is an approach to philosophy which actually 
begins with Duns Scotus (1266/74-1308). Scotus taught, in 
opposition to the thomistic position, that the soul of man is a 
self-contained reality, a will, rather than the instantiation of 
a generic idea, a mind. Ockham (c 1285-1349), like Scotus an 
English Franciscan, followed the direction of Scotus' thought and 
developed a thoroughgoing nominalist position. Knowledge arises 
from the inner experience of external individual things. He 
rejected the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of 
medieval realism. The evidential basis of all knowledge is the 
direct experience of individual things and particular events. 
The human mind intuitively apprehends existent individuals, their 
sensible qualities and its own acts. It understands them by 
means of cognitive language. Language has a semantic structure 
and contains within it an ontological commitment. One must, 
therefore, distinguish between things and their characteristics 
and signs and their ontological commitments. Universality is a 
characteristic of signs, not things. Whatever is not self-
contradictory is possible. What is actual cannot be established 
by reason alone but depends upon experience. Since God is not 
experienced, His nature can be described by negative signs, but 
cannot be demonstrated. He is known only by revelation. There 
is a sharp cleavage between reason and revelation, knowledge and 
faith. Hence, reason cannot help solve problems of faith. 
Ockham's most productive years were spent at the University of 
Paris and in southern Germany. Among his disciples was Gabriel 
Biel, (c 1410-1495) the German nominalist, who achieved fame at 
~--~--~~-~----=--------------------------~--------------------------d 
.. 
6 
to a form of Christian Platonism which approximates Augustine's, 
he shared with them the belief in the distinction between reve-
/ 
la.tion and reason, between theology and philosophy. To that 
belief must be credited his many remarks attacking and belittling 
the philosophers, notably Aristotle, as a hindrance to theology. 
Philosophy and theology tread separate paths. 
It is not surprising, then, that he developed no systematic 
treatment of his thought. Here and there one finds fragmentary 
pieces, sometimes in surprising places: a lengthy aside in the 
body of a commentary, a paragraph extemporized in the midst of a 
sermon, or arguments sprinkled liberally in the work which forms 
the basis for this study of his philosophic thought, the ~ Servo 
Arbitrio. One cannot help but feel, reading the De Servo 
Arbitrio, that underlying it is a complete philosophic structure, 
fully thought out, whose most prominent parts alone find ex-
pression in his writings. Not too surprisingly one finds that as 
a student at Erfurt University his intimates thought of him as 
TUbingen University. A number of Luther's professors at Erfurt 
studied under Biel, among them Johann Staupitz, (1459-1524) the 
Preceptor of the Augustinian order at Erfurt which Luther 
entered, and Nathin. Luther studied Bie1 1 s Canon of the Mass 
with Staupitz. He studied Biel 1 s commentary on the ~ £f 
Sentences with Nathin in preparation for the Sententiarius 
diploma. For a more detailed treatment of the via moderna at 
Erfurt University, see Fife, Robert Herndon, The Revolt of Martin 
Luther, New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, chapter 4. 
For an examination of Ockham's epistemology see McKeon,~· cit., 
II, pp. 351-421. 
pt 
7 
the philosopher of their group. 5 He was the clear and careful 
thinker, the one with the original ideas and careful arguments. 
/ 
Like Augustine, he underwent a time of psychological testing 
which had both its spiritual and intellectual sides. We have no 
Lutheran Confession to compare with that of Augustine. There are 
comments made to companions at table, preserved in second hand 
6 
asides in various of sources, his .works, a brief autobiographic 
sketch prefacing the first edition of his Latin works , 7 but no 
psychological timetable to show the stages of the development of 
his thought. Undoubtedly the key which unlocked the puzzle of 
theology for Luther was the concept of iustitia. When he under-
stood it in a certain way, suddenly everything fell into place 
and was clear for him. 8 He never doubted his theology again. No 
5crotus Rubeanus, Luther's roommate at Erfurt wrote to 
a friend that Luther was regarded as an "erudite philosopher" by 
fellow students. Schwiebert, ~·cit., p. 133. 
6The famous Tischreden, "Table-talk", written: for 
posterity by friends accustomed to gather at Luther's table for 
conversation after he had become a celebrity. Se a recent trans-
lation: Luther's Works, Table Talk, 54, ed. & tr. Theodore G. 
Tappert, gen. ed. Helmut L. Lehmann, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1967. 
7The Opera Latina I, published in 1545. 
8Luther himself indicated that the key concept which 
was unclear for many years was iustitia. He kept thinking of it 
in terms of a condition of God which so far removes Him from 
human unrighteousness that He cannot but punish them in His 
wrath. When he conceived of it as also imputed to men by faith 
so that they are saved by it, he, to use his words, "felt as 
though 1 had been born again". The moment of insight, referred 
to many times later by Luther, has been called the Turmerlebnis, 
"Tower Discovery", since Luther was studying in his Tower office 
at Wittenberg University when he had the experience. For an 
• 
8 
less important philosophically for him must have been the concept 
of liberum arbitrium. His entire philosophic outlook flows from 
/ 
this concept. Given the free choosing of God, what follows about 
everything else? Until 1516 he a~cepted the nominalist doctrine 
of human free choice. After that he openly challenged its com-
patibility with divine freedom. Augustine states in his 
Confessions that though he could not for many years understand 
God in any way except as material he never doubted that God 
exists. When he learned from the Platonists to think of God as 
immaterial, then his intellectual difficulties began to dissi-
9 pate. Similarly Luther might have said that though he never 
doubted that God acted freely he was not able to think of human 
beings other than as freely acting. W~en however, he learned 
from Augustine and St. Paul to think of human behavior as largely 
determined by forces beyond man, then his philosophic (and for 
that matter his theological) uncertainties began to dissipate. 
Beyond a doubt the formative years after he had forsaken 
the law school for the monastery were years during which first 
his philosophic outlook changed and then his theological thought 
crystalized. The seeds for that crystalization were planted many 
years before. To them, then, we must first turn to understand 
extended treatment of Luther's psychological struggle leading to 
this experience see Schwiebert, 2£• cit., pp. 285-289, and 
Mackinnon, QQ. cit., chapters IV and V; in particular chapter V, 
section III. 
9Book 7, Chapter 20. 
" 
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Luther the Philosopher. 
Luther's formal elementary and secondary training followed 
/ 
the traditional basic liberal arts curriculum, the trivium of 
grammar, rhetoric and logic. 10 It aimed at the assimilation and 
sharpening of the use of the basic intellectual tool of the 
middle ages, Latin. Luther attended first the Trivialschule at 
Mansfeldt. On the primary level he studied the Latin primer, 
together with religion and music for Sunday worship. The middle 
grade experiences centered on the Latin grammar of Donatus 
together with extracts from Aesop, Cato and other classical 
moralists, for the moral training of the young. The upper level 
focused on advanced grammar and syntax. 
Luther received his secondary education in Magdeburg and 
Eisenach. The curriculum was divided into grammar, rhetoric and 
logic, which in those days, involved the reading and writing of 
poetry, the study and practice of composition and the i~provement 
of discourse, particularly of argumentative discourse. He also 
broadened his study of the Latin classics. A portion of the 
curriculum was devoted to improvement in spiritual exercises. 
While in Liberal Arts studies at the University of Erfurt, 
Luther made the acquaintance both of scholastic and humanistic 
approaches to learning. Like many another university at the 
1
°For a discussion of the medieval educational system 
and Luther's academic career, see Mackinnon, QE• cit., I, 
chapter II, ii, "School and University Career." 
,... 
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time, in the midst of a variety of schools of thought boasting 
their adherents in the faculty and student body, one school 
/ 
tended to dominate. At Erfurt the dominant approach was the 
nominalist approach of Ockham and Biel. It followed the ~ 
moderna and was open to the epistemological insights and psycho-
logical interests which, at least as far back as Grosseteste, had 
11 
marked the English approach to knowledge. A lesser English 
influence at Erfurt was exercised by Scotus. 12 Paris and Louvain 
were represented on the faculty by certain persons still teaching 
the via antigua, the traditional Aristotelian approach to know-
ledge. Finally, the latest intellectual movement, humanism, 
filtering up from Italy and given new momentum by persons like 
Valla and Erasmus, also had its effect. 13 Judging by the time in 
11Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (c 1175-1253), 
was interested in the application of mathematics to experience. 
He with his disciple, Adam of Marsh, was one of the first 
scientists in the modern tradition and an early precursor of 
Newton. He was particularly interested in the study of per-
spective, contributing an early treatise on the properties of 
light. His basic philosophic outlook is Platonic. The standard 
Grosseteste biography is F. s. Stevenson, Robert Grosseteste, 
Bishop of Lincoln (London 1899). A recent treatment is A. c. 
Crombie's Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental 
Science, (Oxford, 1953). 
12The Gabrielist nominalists at Erfurt tended to 
identify the Scotists with the Thomists as both committed to- the 
~ antigua. Hence, even though Duns Scotus was the philo-
sophical forebear of Biel through Ockham, the German nominalists 
and scotists considered themselves as disciples of different 
traditions. Of the three schools of thought at Erfurt, the 
scotist group represented the smallest number on the faculty. 
13
nuring the time Luther studied at Erfurt there was no 
permanent faculty representing the humanistic outlook. Both 
faculty and students were, however, a"1are of the movement, 
11 
residence of well known humanists a.t Erfurt, Luther was not sub-
jected to much of their influence. Yet, Luther's later career 
/ 
and the effect which he had upon the curriculum offered at the 
University of Wittenberg, shows that their influence on Luther 
far outweighed the time they spent at Erfurt. Yet, who is to sa . 
Humanism.was the new darling of the students and the young intel-
lectuals of northern Europe when Luther began to teach. It was 
in the air. Only the older, settled professors were immune to 
its charm. Its primary appeal was to the young. 
Be that as it may, Luther's undergraduate year and a half 
was devoted to a study of Aristotelian grammar, rhetoric, logic, 
physics and metaphysics. He participated in the required exer-
cises and disputations which accompanied the lectures and was 
active in the student club which met to discuss philosophy. 
The baccalaureate was followed by a two-year masters program 
involving tutoring the undergraduate students (a sort of graduate 
assistanceship), studying advanced classes in Aristotle, plus 
mathe~atics and ethics. The mathematical curriculum was divided 
into the quadrivium of music, arithmetic, geometry and astronomy. 
Luther studied, in addition to Aristotle (read in Latin), Cicero, 
particularly as Erasmus became famous. By contrast with the 
difficulty of content and aridity of style of all three scholas-
tic schools, the clarity and richness of humanistic writings had 
a natural appeal for students. And, of course, humanistic 
iconoclasm was not lost on those young minds. 
.... 
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Vergil, Livy and Plautus, among others, and read some scholastic 
theology. The awarding of the Master of Arts degree carried with 
/ 
it the requirement of remaining for two years to teach at the 
university. With this in mind, Luther enrolled in the school of 
Law at Erfurt to continue his studies while teaching, but three 
months later suddenly entered the Augustinian monastery at 
Erfurt. 14 
At the conclusion of his novitiate, on instruction of his 
order, he prepared for ordination to the priesthood by studying 
Biel's Canon of the Mass. Thus, he continued under the Ockhamite 
influence even in the monastery. Though an ordained priest, his 
primary training was in liberal arts. Three years after entering 
the monastery, and a year and a half after entering the priest-
hood, Luther was transferred by his order to the young University 
of Wittenberg to teach Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics. The 
Augustinian monastery at Wittenberg was closely related to the 
University. At the time of Luther's arrival it filled two chair~ 
14He began the study of law in May of 1505. Having 
completed his liberal education with the terminal master's degre~ 
Luther was beginning professional training in the field of law. 
He suddenly entered the Augustinian monastery on the 17th of July, 
1505. There has been much speculation about the "real" reas~>n· 
for this sudden change. In the dedication to his father of his 
work On Monastic Vows, 1521, he states that he was called to the 
vocation by the terrors of heaven, and in fear of immanent death, 
he swore an irrevocable vow. The reference is apparently to a 
thunderstorm in which he was caught in the summer of 1505 when 
lightning struck nearby. For a perceptive analysis of the prob-
lem see Mackinnon,~· cit., chapter II, section I. 
' 
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Biblical Theology, taught by the head of the order, John 
staupitz, and Moral Philosophy, now taught by Luther/ Later, he 
also taught Aristotle's Physics to the monks at Wittenberg. 
While teaching at t</ittenberg; Luther began his theologica 1 
studies to prepare himself to lecture on theology. After six 
months he received the Bachelor of Bible degree and began to 
lecture on biblical exegesis as well as on ethics. He began 
studying the Book of Sentences in preparation for his examination 
for the degree of Sententiarius. He passed the examination about 
six months later and ~Y'as beginning to prepare for lecturing on 
the Sentences when he was reassigned back to Erfurt to complete 
requirements for the awarding of the degree. The University of 
Erfurt was understandably reluctant to comply on several counts: 
their young Master a few years before had forsaken the classroom 
for the monastery. He had taken up studies elsewhere and com-
pleted a portion of his degree requirements there rather than at 
Erfurt. Wittenberg's requirements were much less stringent than 
those of Erfurt. However, the University finally complied. 
Luther was next persuaded by Staupitz to study for the 
Doctor of Divinity Degree, no doubt with the thought in mind that 
Luther should replace Staupitz at Wittenberg. Luther began, for 
the first time, a serious study of Augustine. Upon the reception 
of the doctorate Luther returned to Wittenberg as professor of 
Biblical Theology. 
For better than a century the battle of the via moderna 
jP -----------------------------------------------------------, 
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against the via antigua had been raging in the universities of 
Europe. In recent years the new voice of humanism, particularly 
/ . 
Biblical humanism, had been raised against both ways.. The oldest 
voice, the via antigua, the logic~l tradition, had stoutly 
opposed the rhetorical tradition of the ~ moderna. Now human-
ism, espousing a grammatical tradition, opposed both. Luther 
gave little evidence of which direction he would go. For all 
practical purposes he seemed to share the rhetorical approach of 
the Ockhamites. Yet within four years he rejected nominalism as 
an approach to theology and influenced the change of the currie-
ulum away from Aristotle to a more humanistic approach. 
Frederick the Wise, Elector of Saxony, had founded 
Wittenberg University in 1502. It was.six years old when Luther 
taught ethics there, and ten when he returned as Professor of 
Theology. At its inception the university was thoroughly scho-
lastic. The largest segment of the faculty, led by Andreas 
Carlstadt, was thomistic in outlook. The second largest segment, 
led by Nicolas Amsdorf, was scotist. In 1507 Trutvetter was 
imported from Erfurt to introduce the nominalist position. 
The curriculum resembled that which Luther himself had 
encountered at Erfurt, the trivium and quadrivium, based on 
Aristotle in Latin translation. The theological curriculum 
centered around the study of the ~ of Sentences. But by 1516, 
largely due to Luther's influence, the old curriculum was gone. 
The new curriculum was based on the study of languages, Greek, 
p 
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Hebrew, and classical and church Latin. Advanced courses 
offered studies in the great writings of antiquity, pagan and 
/ 
Christian. The theological curriculum centered on exegetical 
Bible studies, based on Hebrew and Greek texts. The new univer-
sity had developed a decidedly linguistic character. The key to 
successful university work was no longer logic, but rather 
language. 
The effect of the curriculum change on the education offered 
by the university was more profound than is immediately apparent. 
Of course the language faculty increased rapidly, bringing, among 
others, the man who after Luther would be the university's 
brightest star, Philip Melanchthon. The library began to gather 
texts in a variety of languages. But these were the most obvious 
changes. 
Students and faculty, with the aid of the new languages were 
now able to study primary source materials in the original 
languages. They were not limited to secondary sources or expli-
cated and expurgated Latin translations. Whatever manuscripts 
and books their library contained they could read. More and more 
critical editions of Latin and Greek classics were being printed 
in Europe and the librarian began assiduously to gather in short 
order a respectable library. What formerly were known only by 
name, the whole ancient world of the pagan philosophers and poets 
and early Greek Church Fathers, were now available and could be 
read. It was possible now to compare original with Latin 
\ 
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translation or with commentary to judge the accuracy and adequacy 
of the interpretation. In the process many time-honored 
/ 
reputations fell. The situation was somewhat similar to the 
rediscovery of Aristotle in the 13th century when the new logic 
(of Aristotle, ironically enough) replaced the old logic which 
for centuries had passed for Aristotle's thought. With the 
appearance of Moerbecke's translations, and others, men like 
Aquinas were freed to develop the full implications of Aristotle~ 
thought, locked in a foreign tongue since before Augustine with 
the exception of what was available in Boethius. Now, at 
Wittenberg, the Greek world of the ancient poets, dramatists and 
philosophers was rapidly being unlocked as well as the Greek and 
Hebrew world of the Bible. 
With language emphasis, inevitably the shift took place in 
basic methodology from syllogistic to semiotic considerations. 
The art of the exegete took precedence over the art of_the 
logician. Subtleties of meaning replaced subtleties of argument 
as the primary focus of class lectures. The direction of the 
university changed from the preservation and perpetuation of the 
ancient tradition to the getting back to primitive meanings. The 
authorities began to lose their authority, some because it was 
now apparent that they didn't know what they were talking about; 
the rest because they were notso necessary as before to connect 
the present with the ancient past. Greek and Hebrew now bridged 
the gap. 
p 
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What of Luther himself? It is always difficult to distin-
guish cause from effect. To what extent is a man ajfected by his 
times? To what extent do some elements of his time affect him 
because they are compatible with what he is? One cannot with 
certainty say. We shall hazard only a few remarks about his 
basic philosophic outlook. To what extent it was shaped by the 
tradition of Ockham and by the humanists one can only guess. 
The Ockham tradition, wed to Aristotle, was inevitably bound 
to fail; for even with the greatest latitu9e of interpretation 
Aristotle was not a nominalist. By Luther's time this was 
becoming evident. But the Ockham tradition, wed to Plato, had a 
greater chance to survive. Augustine falls in the Platonic 
tradition. St. John, one of the two great scriptural influences 
on Luther, has a philosophic outlook more compatible with Plato 
than with Aristotle. To a lesser extent the same is true of the 
other great influence, St. Paul. What all of these have in 
common, nominalism, Augustine, St. John and St. Paul, is dia-
lectic. The basic· tool of Aristotle and Aquinas is syllogistic. 
Dialectic is useful only in those disciplines where syllogistic 
cannot be used: ethics and the establishment of first principles. 
Understandably enough, then, Luther, as he reached his own 
philosophic maturity and began to teach with less and less depen-
dence on his own teachers, began to take exception to the trust 
of the church in Aristotle: Aristotle is inconsistent with 
Christian theology: his god is asleep, a cause which is ignorant 
18 
of the world of man and effects it strictly as a final cause; the 
unmoved movers in the metaphysics are incompatible with human 
/ 
choice in the Ethics; Aristotle's system requires the eternality 
of rna tter. 
In 1516 Luther publically broke with the nominalist tra-
clition over the role of grace in conversion and denied the capa-
city of the human will, 11~ puris naturalibus", to act freely in 
spiritual matters prior to conversion. In 1517 he attacked all 
of "scholastic theology", including the three old traditions, 
Thomism, Scotism and Ockhamism. He attacked nominalism in a set 
of 97 theses which he offered to defend. In 1518, at the Con-
ference of the Augustinian monasteries of northern Europe, he 
offered his Heidelberg Theses as a program of educational reform 
to replace Aristotelian nominalism. These same ideas are 
reflected in his 1524 treatise, A Letter to the German Nobility, 
in his proposals for change in the educational system ~f Germany. 
For the most part Luther's philosophic development had taken 
place in a generally Aristotelian setting. For about two cen-
turies the philosophic outlook of Thomas Aquinas had been the 
accepted outlook of the church. It had proved fruitful in 
-
resolving doctrinal and practical issues and had made possible 
within the academic world the development of a unified body of 
disciplines. In central Europe by Luther's time the Ockham 
variety of Aristotelianism had taken precedence over Thomism. 
But Luther was at heart a Platonist. He found in Augustine a 
F 
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compatibility he did not find in Aristotle. From a philosophic 
standpoint he was an idealist in a realistic intellectual enviro 
/ 
ment. One can, then, understand, on purely intellectual grounds, 
why he found pragmatic accommodation to the economic necessities 
of the operational church incompatible with what he felt was 
right. For a Platonic idealist, knowledge and practice are 
. bl 15 1nsepara e. 
In a second way his philosophic inclination was incompatible 
with his age. For his.age was dominated br the logical traditio~ 
refined and crystalized into that gem of medieval methodology, 
the scholastic method. Luther was a rhetorician. In this he 
found himself in agreement with the nominalist tradition and 
Augustine, but quite out of sympathy with the pure Aristotelians. 
They hedged him in, were "logic choppers''; they inhibited the 
free flow of ideas which dialectic fostered with its discursive 
methods of distinction and combination. To the extent.that the 
nominalists were rhetorical logicians Luther felt companionable 
to them. To the extent that they sought to fit their logic to 
the Aristotelian mold he rejected them and called them sophists. 
It is no surprise that from a methodological standpoint 
Luther felt at home with the great Church rhetoricians Augustine 
and Ambrose, or, for that matter, with the greatest of the pagan 
15
or, as Plato put it, "Knowledge is virtue." For 
Aristotle, however, there is a distinction between the theoretic, 
the practical and the productive. · 
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Latin rhetoricians, Cicero and Quintillian. He had a natural 
sympathy for the classical poets and the Weltanschauung of the 
/ 
tragic Greek mind. He gained an early reputation as preacher and 
was an immediate and continuing success as a pamphleteer and 
polemicist. Most of his non-exegetical works are rhetorical: 
polemics, exhortations, refutations, etc. And when one examines 
his exegetical works, the rhetorical impress is there again in 
the obvious concern to make the meaning of the text lively and 
vivid for the hearer and reader. He was a great classroom 
lecturer, attracting and exciting the young students with his 
dynamic presentations. 
Unlike the humanists with their concern for style and 
polish, for the elegant phrase and the clever saying, Luther is 
16 
rough-hewn, often coarse. He seldom rewrites a paragraph. His 
language is vivid and striking. His is a language which is 
primarily a spoken language and only derivatively written. He is 
not a logician, as he knew logicians. He is unsystematic. The 
method he finds most compatible with his own philosophic incli-
nations is the method of common-places, Aristotle's Topics, 
dialectical logic. Yet he feels more at home in Aristotle's 
Rhetoric than in his logic, although he is familiar with both. 
His view of man is voluntaristic, the view of a rhetorician. 
The Aristotelian view of man was rationalistic. Tradition saw 
16L·k 1 ... h. d h b 1 e many a po em1c1st 1n 1s ay, e was not a ove 
an ea.':: thy image or express ion if it sui ted his fancy. 
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man as a mind in the body of an animal. What "'as peculiarly 
huwan was intellect. The passions belonged to the animal nature 
. / 
and tended to intrude upon and disrupt the calm reasonable 
operation of the hun~n organism. Ockham was a voluntarist, as 
was Biel. This side of the nominalists Luther never forsook, 
although he parted from them on the subject of human freedom. 
For Luther, then, man is a will, a moving force, subject to 
stimulus, moved by persuasion. He is motivated to act and can be 
carried avtay by impulse and caprice. His rational capacities are 
the tools of his will to discover means whereby the urgings of 
the will can be satisfied. His passions are the expressions of 
his very nature and are both good and bad. 
Luther does not see man as Aristotle, Aquinas and others see 
him, an intellect whose highest function is speculation. Man is 
a calculating creature who follows his peculiar bents, moved this 
way and that by what strikes his fancy. He is restless, a moving 
spirit, active, passionate and vital. To be a man is to be 
active and doing things in the world. 
Finally, by philosophic bent at odds with the general 
philosophic climate of his day, the methodology of his age, and 
its accepted view of man, Luther's philosophic inclination is 
oriented to change, to the real, the original, the primitive. 
For this reason he was open to humanistic innovations, though not 
a humanist. In Platonic fashion he sees a universe in flux, but 
as a rhetorical Platonist he finds change compatible to him. In 
jiP 
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this, he is perhaps more Heraclitean than Platonic. His theology 
is dynamic. He tends to focus upon the uniqueness of individuals 
/ 
and their independences, not upon their commonalities and 
dependencies. Hence, for him what holds men together, Laws and 
societies, are positivities, artificial conventions arrived at 
for commonly accepted ends. Every man is his own priest. The 
organized church with its ecclesiastical structure is a human 
convention, not a divinely ordained way of carrying out the 
function of God's men in the.world. And if something better can 
be found to do that task it ought properly to take the place of 
that structure. The individual conscience is sacred and must not 
be abused. Is it any wonder that the revolut"ionary forces 
organizing the peasant rebellion saw in Luther in the early 1520 
their intellectual leader? He stands in sharp contrast to his 
age in what he taught; and what he accomplished must be under-
stood in the light of that contrast. Because he stands in sharp 
contrast, he is not the product of any of the forces of his 
times, nor even the result of the accidental intersection of many 
forces. He is a new voice. 
Four voices vied for attention when Luther came upon the 
intellectual scene. The oldest and most venerable of the tra-
ditional voices, Thomism, affected him the least; for it was of 
all, the most incompatible with his philosophic inclinations and 
the one least clearly and distinctly spoken to him. 
The second voice from the via antigua, Scotism, was not 
, 
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altogether clear in his day. Luther heard this Oxonian voice 
echoing in Wittenberg when he came, if not before at Erfurt; but 
/ 
d • i . 17 he foun 1t an uncerta n vo1ce. 
The third voice, again originally a British voice, but one 
which spoke with the German tongue of the Gabrielites, Luther 
heard during his formative undergraduate and graduate days, but 
this voice of the via moderna, though it was in many ways com-
patible to his own outlook, he rejected because it resembled too 
1 h f . 18 great y t e ormer vo1ces. 
Finally, from the southern Italian renaissance there had 
come a voice which found a sympathetic echo in the European low-
lands, the voice of humanism, the echo of Erasmus. It did not 
espouse a particular worldview; it advocated an attitude and a 
method. Luther declined the attitude and incorporated the method 
. h. h 19 1n 1s own approac • The method led him back to Augustine and 
from Augustine to St. John and St. Paul. 
From the west and Thomas' Paris, the north and Scotus' 
Oxford, the surrounding German lands and Biel's T6bingen, from 
1 Duns Scotus was not very well represented by the 
Scotists there. They tended to be dominated by the Thomists. 
18
rn its Aristotelian structure and its acceptance of 
human free will, it was, for him, just another brand of Scho-
lasticism. 
19The attitude of confidence in mankind and his capa-
city to cope with life is diametrically opposed to Luther's 
position. He did take, from the humanists, however, their method 
of linguistic studies and their emphasis on primary sources as 
the foundation for education. · 
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the south and north, Valla's Florence and Erasmus• Louvain, the 
voices came. There was no eastern voice, for to the ea.st lay the 
/ 
lands oppressed by the "Turk". The voices reverberated first at 
Erfurt, then at Wittenberg for the young Luther. When he raised 
his own voice he spoke first from the Ockham-Biel tradition. But 
as his voice gathered confidence it moved apart from them to 
utter a new sound. What he proposed called the academic world 
away from a tradition steeped in Aristotle to an older tradition 
steeped in Augustine's Platonism. If the voice needs a name, 
. 
call it Lutheranism. That fifth voice and the philosophic impli-
cations of what it said constitute the remainder of this book. 
p 
CHAPTER II 
LIBERUM ARBITRIUM--THE PROBLEM OF GOOD AND KVIL 
The "free will problem" very likely dates as far back as 
the first serious reflection on the nature of human action. For 
the conditions which--even today--compel us to re-examine our 
previous explanations of how human beings act, tend often to be 
the same conditions which raise the "free will problem" again. 
It is a peculiar kind of problem. First of all, it has 
persisted with a strange tenacity throughout the entire history 
of philosophic investigation, sometimes looming menacingly in the 
forefront of the philosophic spectrum and commanding the atten-
tion of the best thinkers of an era; at other times lying in the 
background relatively unimportant, lacking in philosophic vigor, 
even though unre·solved--another of the chestnuts which philos-
ophers are wont, upon occasion, to roll out and roast when they 
have nothing better to do. In this peculiarity, however, the 
"free will problem" is not unique. For other classical philo-
sophie problems have had similar careers. 
Secondly, the "free will problem"--one hesitates to call it 
"the" problem, since every time it arises it seems to assume a 
different form--unlike most philosophic problems, is interdis-
ciplinary, arising from a discontinuity between the implications 
for human action of two or more intellectual disciplines as one 
or the other develops. One of the disciplines is invariably 
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ethics or psychology. The resolution of the "free will problem" 
then, whether recognized or not, involves an effor~ somehow to 
harmonize the two conflicting disciplines with one another. 
The source of the problem, to some extent, lies in the 
varying natures of the theoretic and the practical disciplines. 
Practical sciences require freedom in some fashion or other as a 
condition for action. Consequently, it is to their interest to 
preserve within the theoretic sciences an area of chance, uncer-
tainty, unpredictability, unexplainability--call it what you 
will--which will leave room for decision making. 
On the other hand, theoretic sciences naturally aim at 
developing a closed system of explanation, admitting no excep-
tions, in order by means of it to describe and to predict. 
Randomness in any sector of the system limits its predictive 
adequacy and accuracy. From a temporal standpoint a theoretic 
science tends to require a closed future (or none at a~l) while 
a practical science requires an open future. 
When, then, a scientific theory which represents an advance 
over previous theories in closing the future and limiting the 
area of unpredictability, begins to achieve acceptance, it under-
cuts the foundations on which the practical sciences of the time 
are based. The "free will problem" emerges as an inter-dis-
ciplinary discontinuity. 
Because the "free will problem" involves interdisciplinary 
considerations, one must somehow deal with it working with a 
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"foot in each discipline"; or, since the problem must be solved 
in an interdisciplinary way--each discipline stout~ resisting 
change in its own formulations--if possible, some neutral ground 
of common meeting must be found wherein the problem can be 
interpreted and, if possible, resolved. Such a common ground has 
usually been wholly, or in part, philosophical. For, belonging 
properly in no single discipline, since it is interdisciplinary 
in character, and defying resolution, the problem naturally comes 
sooner or later to the attention of the thinker who deals with 
such problems, the philosopher. 
Luther's "free will problem" in its initia 1 form involves 
purely theological considerations. For Luther it is the class-
ical question of the cause of conversion, a question which exer-
cised the Christian church even before Augustine and was still 
debated at Luther's time. 1 Is conversion the result of human 
1The question of conversion involves the "free will 
problem", for it is concerned with whether or not there is any 
human choice in the act of conversion. Augustine arguing that 
conversion is a divine act, opposed the doctrine of Pelagius, a 
British monk, that the conversion from opposition to God to faith 
in God is an act of human choice. The Pelagian view was con-
demned at the Council of Ephesus in 431. A few years later 
another group attempted to find a middle ground ben1een Augustine 
and Pelagi.us, semi-pelagianism, explaining conversion as a 
combination of human activity and divine grace. This sort of 
approach tended to persist through the middle ages. It was 
opposed by John Wycliff (1320-1384) and John Hus (1369-1415) 
before Luther. Luther in his debate with John Eck at Leipzig 
defended Hus on this doctrine and defended Wycliff inter alios 
in his argument with Erasmus. 
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choice, of divine decision, or of joint divine-human activity? 
In order to answer these questions one must previo~ly arrive at 
conclusions about states of affairs which fall outside the dis-
cipline of theology. The answers to these sorts of questions 
involve interdisciplinary considerations. Decisions have to be 
made concerning the nature of human choice, the scope and limits 
of choice, the limits of human responsibility, the possibility of 
independent human activity, the nature of willing, etc., questio~ 
involving, at a minimum, psychology and ethics. 
Since, then, the theological question has existential 
signigicance, if the theological answer which is given denies the 
existential capacity to act, the free will question both arises 
and becomes a vital issue. For the theological answer intrudes 
upon and apparently contradicts some of the basic presuppositions 
necessary for a viable ethic, human freedom and responsibility. 
Luther argues on theological grounds for an absence of human 
activity in conversion. He is concerned at all costs to preserve 
the complete freedom of God to act. As a result, he must in some 
way reconcile that divine freedom with the minimal conditions for 
a human ethic. Otherwise his theology has no existential value. 
A theology which lacks existential implication for a practical 
ethic, lacks the reason or the substance for survival; and, since 
it lacks existential implications, it cannot but either turn back 
upon itself as a curious but wholly irrelevant creation of human 
thought which may be analyzed and enjoyed in fashion as a painting 
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or a game or a pure mathematical construct are enjoyed; or be 
taken seriously, frustrate the development of an e~ic -and hang 
over the civilization it dominates like a deadly miasma, suffo-
eating all its efforts to act. Neither condition is tolerable. 
Luther himself saw his problem as somewhat the reverse of 
that we have just described, for he seems to have feared that the 
development of an ethic of human freedom would come into conflict 
with and suppress the vitality of any theology which purported 
to have existential significance and involvement. If God enters 
into our experience and has anything to do with it, then there 
must be a role for God to play. He cannot simply be an idea, a 
spectator or a slave. If God is not fully God, then He is 
unnecessary. 
This concern of Luther's about the relative relationships 
of the divine and the human in human action is surprisingly 
modern. One needs go no further back in philosophic history 
h S h . . . 1 2 t an artre to note t e same 1.n1.t1:a concern. For both begin 
with the same postulate. If God exists, then man is not free. 
They differ in the minor premise they accept; and, as a result, 
the conclusion each reaches is radically different. For Sartre, 
2Note in particular chapter Two of Part IV, Being and 
Nothingness, entitled "Existential Psychoanalysis", New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1956, pp. 566-568. This chapter is also 
published separately by Philosophical Library under the title 
Existential Psychoanalysis. The question of divine versus human 
freedom is also examined in the early paragraphs of Sartre's 
Essay, "Existentialism is a Humanism." 
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existential human freedom is a prime fact of existence, perhaps 
the only prime fact. Its facticity militates agai~t any onto-
logical significance for God. Therefore, God does not exist. 
Luther, on the other hand, finds freedom ontologically necessary. 
But ontological freedom is a characteristic of which only God is 
capable. Thus, human freedom is a chimera. 
Somehow or other a metaphysical doctrine must make existen-
tial sense. A doctrine such as human unfreedom is particularly 
difficult to interpret in a manner which results in existential 
consequences that jibe with our everyday experience. One can 
always argue that our naive experience is mistaken and thereby 
solve the problem. This is the easy way. It is, however, one 
thing to argue for the mistakenness of our experience; but 
another task--unfortunately one seldom undertaken--to explain then 
why it is that naive experience maintains such a persistent hold 
on our credibility. 
The much more difficult alternative is to attempt to resolve 
the metaphysical problem of human unfreedom in a way which is 
consistent with our naive experience. Luther's is one of the few 
efforts to attempt such a resolution. 
ONTOLOGICAL DETERHINISM3 
According to Luther the expression liberum arbitrium is 
3
one must carefully distinguish three different levels 
of thought in Luther's conception of liberum arbitrium. He 
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significant in its fullest sense only on the ontological level 
where it refers to the activity of the divine \-Till/creating and 
preserving the being of the objects of its intent. "It is a 
divine name and signifies a divine strength (virtus). 114 
Definition 
Luther nowhere explicity in an organized fashion examines 
what is meant by "freely choosing". Perhaps, since the expres-
sion essentially characterizes an activity of which God alone is 
capable 5 it is beyond definition. Luther does at one place offer 
a description of liberum arbitrium which he attributes to popular 
thought: "a force (vis) which is able freely (libere) to turn 
itself to anything whatsoever, and such a force would not yield 
6 
or submit itself to any." 
himself does not make the distinction--although he consistently 
observes them--nor does he identify them by names. For purposes 
of clarity I have labeled then: the ontological level, the 
manichaean level and the existential level. More neutral expres-
sions like level 1, 2 and 3 or X, Y and Z might have been used, 
but these were chosen because each has some descriptive signif-
icance for the level it identifies and has the further value of 
relating these three aspects of Luther's thought to their histor-
ical antecedents and descendents in other philosophical systems. 
The first level ontologically is prior to the other two. The 
second is temporally as well as ontologically prior to the third. 
4wA XVIII, p. 664. 
5Ibid., p. 662. 
6Ibid., p. 637. The description as a definition con-
tains a slight inelegance since liberum is defined in part by 
libere. What Luther perhaps had in mind by the term "libere" is 
"facilly, without limitation". If this phrase is substituted for 
the expression in the description, the apparent circularity is 
removed. 
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The description contains three characteristics: liberum 
arbitrium is 1) a power {vis), 2) of self-turning~ anything 
whatsoever, and 3) unyielding and superior to anything else. The 
study of liberum arbitrium, then, is the study of the activity of 
God, His energy, His dynamic. The activity is self-energized. 
The power is under the direction of God and can be directed by 
God to move Himself to anything whatsoever. God cannot, however, 
be moved or overpowered by another being. He has active and 
middle capacities but not passivity. 
Characteristics 
Scattered throughout De Servo Arbitrio are passages contain-
ing or hinting at other characteristics of liberum arbitrium or 
of a will possessed of this capacity. There is a sort of loose 
logic which relates these characteristics to one another, some 
of which Luther indicates. We shall attempt to supply that which 
he omits. 
Predetermination 
Speaking on the topic of divine foresight and the doctrine 
of predestination, Luther says that if God did not have elective 
ability "what would He be but chance under whose influence every-
thing would be random happening. 117 The exercise of liberum 
arbitrium, obviously, is the opposite of chance as a principle of 
explanation of what happens. Some of the typical characteristics 
7Ibid., p. 706. 
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of a chance situaJQX~trf~4t~!~J\#ontaneity, accidential 
occurrence, uncontrolled motio~etc. Opposed to th}s is activity 
which is organized, considered, deliberate, purposeful, effective, 
etc. Because Luther replaces the traditional opposition of 
freedom and determinism by the opposition of freedom and chance, 
predetermination is entailed by freedom as a necessary condition. 
The exclusion of chance requires that an entity possessing 
liberum arbitrium not only have the capacity to examine all 
possible options and to act on any alternative, but also that it 
successfully complete its options 9 and that nothing unexpected 
occur. What it predetermines and only what it predetermines must 
occu~otherwise it is not free. 
Omnipotence 
The capacity to exercise any option, entailed also by 
liberum arbitrium, is more familiarly identifiable by the expres-
sion "omnipotence". Luther defines it as: 
not the potency (potentiam) by which He (God) does 
not make many things He has the capacity to make, but 
that actuality, by which He powerfully makes every-
thing, in that sense that Scripture calls Him omni-
potent.8 
For choice to be possible there must be options other than 
that actually made. God has ·alternatives other than those He 
exercises. They are possible because He thinks them, for He 
creates their possibility by thinking them. Otherwise, they 
8Ibid., p. 718. 
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would have no being. But when He acts, no actions other than 
those God performs are possible for His action exclydes their 
existence. He creates all that can be. From an ontological 
standpoint, then, everything is done by God. This is what is 
meant by omnipotence, 11 doing everything11 , not, as in the scho-
la stic sense Luther opposed, 11 capa ble of doing anything11 • Apart 
from the ontological action of God there is no action. He does 
it all. Since God is impassive no state of affairs can be 
explained or accounted for on the grounds of divine permissive-
ness or toleration. God knows everything and does everything. 9 
Necessity 
11 If God foreknows, the thing happens necessarily ••• • God 
neither errs nor makes mistakes. 1110 Necessity of which Luther 
9
since nothing is independent of God, nothing is 
possible unless God causes it to be possible, at a minimum, by 
thinking of it. Whatever at one time or another is humanly con-
ceived as possible comprises but a portion of divine possibility. 
There is another body of possibles which, from a human standpoint 
are inconceivable since they do not fall within the scope of 
reality of which humanity is a part. At the same time these 
latter possibles are conceivable for God by virtue of the sheer 
fact that He does conceive them even though He gives them no 
being in any other form than His thought. The ontological level 
of reality as Luther conceives it embraces the entire activity of 
God acting freely--to an infinitesmal portion of which we with 
our limited intelligence are privy. The major portion is hidden. 
Whence Luther speaks of this as Deus absconditus, the hidden side 
of God. It may well be that because we are privy to only a 
portion we think experience is contingent, whereas if we knew the 
rationale of the whole we would recognize and understand how it 
is a completely predetermined pattern of events. 
10 WA XVIII, p. 717. 
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speaks holds for the relation between the will of God and the 
event, not for God Himself. The capacity perfectl'ito preplan, 
eliminates the possibility of error. 
Unchangeability 
There is a sort of necessity which holds for the divine wil 
the necessity of changelessness. 
I \o~ould wish that there could be given a better 
word • • • than the usua 1 term "necess i ty11 , which is 
not rightly used either in describing the divine or 
the human will. For it is much too graceless and 
incongruous in signification for this topic, as 
though there were a sort of compulsion, something 
going against the will, forcing the mind •••• 
For the will, be it divine or human, does freely 
what it does under no coercion as it wants or 
pleases, whether good or bad; yet, however, the 
will of God which governs our changeable will is 
changeless and infallible, as Boethius sings: 
"Stable and permanent, you give movement to alt."ll 
Infallibility 
Fallibility is possible when an agent's power exceeds his 
understanding or his knowledge, his capacity, or when both are 
equal to the other, but limited. Since God is not limited in any 
way He cannot fail. 
Would you believe that God unwillingly foresees what 
will happen or expresses His will ignorantly? If He 
foresees events willingly His will is eternal and 
immovable (such is His nature) and if He expresses 
His will with foresight, His knmo1ledge is eternal and 
immovable (such is His nature). From which it follows 
irrefragably that all which we do, all things that 
happen, although they seem mutable to us are in 
11Ibid., p. 616, footnote 1. 
accordance with the will of God. For the will of 
God is effective and cannot be impeded since power 
is the very nature of God; indeed His wisdom ifi 
such that He cannot be impeded, but is done irl 
the place, time, manner and amount that He Himself 
both foresees and wills.12 
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Foresight and omnipotence, i.e., perfect planning and execution 
are, thus, entailed by liberum arbitrium. 
Eternality 
"••• God foreknows nothing contingently, but both foresees, 
proposes and does everything by His unchanging, eternal and 
infallible will. 1113 These three characteristics follow, the one 
from the other. A will with the capacity of liberum arbitrium, 
lacking the capacity to err and superior to any other will is of 
necessity infallible in its choice. If it is infallible then it 
is also unchanging; for there is no reason for it to change. 
Since, then, it expresses itself infallibly and unchangingly, the 
will persists, i.e., is eternal, there being nothin·g which can 
inten:.upt it. 
Primacy 
If the will of God is free, it follows that God is prior to 
any rule or standard. He is the primal being. Luther describes 
God in such fashion: 
God is He for Whose will there is no cause (caussa 
[sic]) or rationale (ratio) which prescribes for Him 
12Ibid., pp. 615, 616. 
13~., p. 615. 
any sort of rule (regula)or measurement (mensura), 
since there is nothing equal or superior to Him, but 
rather He Himself is the rule for everything. For 
if there would be any rule or measurement or iause 
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or rationale for His will it could no longer be the 
will of God. For it is not because He ought or is 
bound to will in such a fashion that He wills as He 
does. On the contrary, it is because He Himself wills 
it in such a fashion that what does happen is obliged 
to be right. The cause and the rationale of the 
creature's will are prescribed, but not that of the 
Creator- unless you would put another creator over 
H. 14 :un. 
Of course, to posit a creator for the Creator would ~e 
unnecessary and would lead to an infinite ~egress. As primal 
entity, then, God is not bound by rules and values but is rather 
their source. Because He is not bound by any rules, He is not 
accountable for His actions. He brings into being whatever He 
wills. 
God in His own nature and majesty, then, is all by 
Himself and, in this respect, we have nothing to do 
with Him, nor is He interested in having us deal with 
Him. We deal with Him clothed and revealed in His 
Word, by means of which He presents Himself to us. 
••• • And He has not set limits for Himself by His 
Word, but keeps Himself free over all things.15 
In conclusion, if the various characteristics which make up 
the notion of liberum arbitrium are gathered together, Luther's 
conception is that of a primal ontological entity possessed of 
14 Ibid., p. 712. Note also: "Natural reason is forced 
to confess that the living and true God must be one if by His own 
liberty He imposes necessity on us. ••• • He-wQuld be ridic-
ulous if He could not and did not do everything or if, apart from 
Him, anything were done." Ibid., p. 718. 
15Ibid., p. 685. 
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the capacity to act without limitation either by itself or 
others. It acts, with complete consciousness, knowJedge and 
power, bringing into being and preserving in its being whatever 
is, achieving its own satisfaction. It is eternal, immutable, 
infallible, irresistible and changeless. Whatever else there is 
is the expression of this power. It is superior to all else for 
if there were its equal or superior it would be limited by the 
other. Man cannot possess liberum arbitrium; for his capacities 
are inferior to its characteristics. EverY.thing happens neces-
sarily according to the divine will for it is the necessary and 
sufficient reason for all things. 
For all men find this proposition written in their 
hearts and recognize it and agree (albeit unwillingly) 
when they hear it propounded. First: that God is 
omnipotent, not only in potency, but also in act, 
(as I have said); were it not so God would be ridic-
ulous. Secondly: that He Himself knows and plans all 
things, neither being able to make a mistake or to 
fail. These two propositions being conceded by all 
hearts and senses, all are compelled to admit by 
inevitable consequences: we are not made by our own 
will but by necessity; thus we do not make whatso-
ever we make by the right of free choice, but instead 
God plans out and acts with an infallible and un-
changing counsel and power. Whence, at the same time, 
men find written in all their hearts: there is no 
such thing as a (human) free choice. Granted that 
it is much obscured by so much disputing to the con-
trary and by the great authoritl of men through the 
ages who have taught otherwise. 6 
16
rbid., p. 719. Pagan sources to \o~hich Luther refers 
in support of his contention for a natural knowledge of divine 
omnipotence and determinism are Virgil, Horace, Roman and Greek 
mythology, all of which make reference to fate and predestinatio~ 
pp. 617-618. . 
~ 
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THE MANICHAEAN DIALECTIC 
Satanic Defection 
/ 
Thus far our analysis of Luther's philosophy has concerned 
itself with one pole of a bipolar, that is dialectical, view of 
reality, the activity of God, accounting for perfection, order, 
metaphysical goodness, unity, etc. The problem at this point is 
the possibility that he has so polarized his approach at one 
extreme of the philosophic spectrum that he will be unable to 
account for the opposite extreme: imperfection, disorder, evil, 
disunity, etc. He posits a God completely free. The danger is 
that this complete freedom will make any other freedom impossibl~ 
If all of reality is reducible to divine ontological activity, it 
may imply the impossibility of h~an practical activity. If it 
does, it will come into contradiction with the facts of everyday 
experience as we know them. 
A universe which is the product of liberum arbitrium will 
function orderly and efficiently. All will be perfect initially 
and consistently fulfill its appointed function in accordance 
with the preplanned program laid down by God. Such a universe, 
however, perfect as it may be, contains no contingency, defi-
·ciency, error or evil. Yet, we think we find all of these 
characteristics in our everyday experience. Luther is unwilling 
to claim that we are mistaken about our experience. How can they 
occur in a universe, the operation of which follows by strict 
necessity from the activity of a perfectly free being? To resolve 
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this problem we must shift from the ontological to the manichaean 
level of meaning. 17 
/ 
Luther provides scanty help to account for the manner in 
which evil originated. The cause is identified as Satan who 
first fell from grace, then tempted man to fa11. 18 How is such 
a fall possible? Luther gives no answer. The doctrine is a part 
of Christian belief. We can, however, suggest a philosophic 
answer consistent with what has already been established as 
Luther's position and supported by one comment of Luther. To be 
of philosophic value, rather than of merely historic or theo-
logical interest, let us pose the question in the most general 
terms and apply the answer to the particular case. How is evil 
possible in a universe created by an entity possessing liberum 
1 I call it the manichaean level because it is the 
level of opposition of super-human forces of good and evil, 
accounting for the origin of evil in the world, traditionally 
associated with the teachings of Mani; and because this level of 
explanation, as found in Augustine and in Luther was mistakenly 
attacked as Manichaean by their opponents. In historic Mani-
chaeanism there are at least two basic differences: 1) the forces 
are of roughly equal pm.;rer and of equal majesty and 2) this 
level is primary in Hanichaeanism, not secondary as in Augustine 
and Luther. 
1811 It is uncertain on what day the fall of the angels 
occurred, whether on the second or on the third [day of creationl 
Only this much can be shown from the gospel, that Satan fell from 
heaven, inasmuch as Christ declares that He saw him fall from 
heaven. [Luke 10:18) 11 Luther's Works, I, Lectures .Q!! Genesis, 
Chapters 1-5. tr. George V. Schick, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan, St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958, p. 150. Bracketed 
rna teria 1 mine. 
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arbitrium? 
Evil is possible where there are thinking entities which can 
/ 
be moved and where two or more possible objects exist toward 
which or against which such entities can be moved. Under such 
conditions motivations can shift from their proper objects to 
improper objects. Such entities can think of what is not the 
case and want it to be the case. Since, in a universe where what 
is the case is produced by liberum arbitrium, what is the case is 
what ought to be the case for entities in that universe. To 
desire what is not the case is to desire what ought not to be to 
exist. This is the essence of evil. 
Luther's position presupposes the existence of at least one 
created entity, Satan, having the opportunity (both God and it 
existed as possible objects of its affection) and the capacity 
(it could feel affection for either) of changing the object of 
its motivation. It moved itself away from its proper end, God, 
to a lesser end, itself, and thereby became deficient in its 
future operation: it acted as though it were God. 
There exists in Luther's writings only one attempt to 
describe Satan's fall. It is found in a sermon preached in 
Wittenberg on Monday of Easter week, April 2, 1526. 
For this reason Satan lost his godlike power, in that 
because of the Son [of God] he was thrown out of 
heaven to the outer reaches of Hell, Is. 14:12, Luke 
10:18, because Satan stood beneath the Son in honor, 
but wanted to be like Him. This God could not 
tolerate .19-
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With the notion of a satanic entity, there is/now posited in 
Luther's thought a second, a destructive principle of action, 
counterposed to the original creative principle, God. It is a 
principle preserved in its being by the original principle, and 
superior to human power, constantly perverting the nature of 
whatever it can contro1. 20 
19Luther 1 s SMrnmtliche Schriften,"III, General editor, 
John George Walch, editor, A. F. Hoppe, St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1894, p. 659. Underlining mine. 
20In several passages Luther vividly describes the 
nature, attitude and actions of this satanic power. "••• in whom 
there is even greater enmity against God, greater hatred and 
fury, than in man, in spite of the fact that he was .not created 
evil but had a will in conformity with the will of God. This 
will he has lost; he has also lost his very beautiful and very 
excellent intellect and has been turned into an awful spirit 
which rages against his Creator. 11 Luther's Works, .22• cit., 
p. 143. It will become apparent that for Luther, to become 
defective, an entity must not only be affected volitionally, but 
also intellectually. It becomes both perverse and stupid. To 
borrow an image from physics, its motion becomes eccentric. An 
entity becomes increasingly deficient as it continues its wayward 
way. If only its volitional faculties were affected it would be 
obstinate and might be increasingly stubborn in persisting in its 
mistake, but this would be simply a matter of degree or intensit~ 
If, however, the rational capacity is also affected, then, it 
becomes incapable of knowing that it is in error and is capable 
of more grievous delusions. "••• the devil everlastingly hates, 
accuses and damns God but exonerates himself; and it is not 
possible for him to say from his heart: 1 Lord, I have sinned, 
forgive me.'" Ibid., p. 179. "••• just as he lacks the promise 
of grace, so he cannot put an end to his transgressions, blas-
phemies and hatred of God." Ibid., p. 180. These latter two 
quotations exhibit the permanence of the Satanic personality. 
Since it is incapable of renovation, it is a persistent principle 
of destruction. "If it were not for the Son of God Satan would 
put an end to every living thing and choke it off from existence." 
Ibid., p. 189. It robs existents of their being. 
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Satanic Domination: The Human Predicament 
Luther accounts for the origin of human evil differently 
/ 
than for the origin of evil itself. Whereas evil originated in a 
perfect universe because of the turning_of a created will from 
its proper object to itself, human evil arose from the limited-
ness of human knowledge and a temptation which capitalized on 
that limitation. 
In his commentary on Genesis, Luther says that the command 
of God not to eat of the tree of good and evil surpassed Adam's 
power to understand. Nothing in his experience singled that tree 
out as different or dangerous. He had to believe the command 
simply because God had given it. He had to take it on faith. 
This, then, gave Satan his opportunity to call into question som~ 
thing man could not possibly examine, the will of God. Satan 
could create doubt and thereby distrust of the divine command. 21 
In the human case, as contrasted with the case of Satan, the 
fall was occasioned, not by a self-engendered change of moti-
vation, but by external motivation, for man can be motivated; he 
. h. lf 22 cannot mot~vate ~mse • 
21 Luther's Works, QE• cit., p. 154. It is interesting 
to note, then, that Luther suggests that limited human intelli-
gence provided the opportunity for evil. This could not have 
been the cause of the fall of Satan, since, as the foremost of 
the angels, he was always in the presence of God. 
22Luther never wrote a treatise on human psychology. 
Some insight into his thinking, however, can be afforded by 
examining what Melanchthon, his associate, said in the Loci 
Communes of 1521, a little book highly praised and completely 
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Since man does not determine his motivations, he is sus-
ceptible to persuasion. Luther interprets the fall of man as 
/ 
a deliberate misleading of the will of man by an unscrupulous 
Sa tan. 
Luther upon occasion talks about the "liberum arbitrium" 
of original man, lost in the fall from grace. He interprets the 
expression differently, however, than he does when applying it 
strictly to God. The expression is contrasted with servum 
approved of by Luther. "••• in giving a description of the 
nature of man, I shall have no need of the many divisions em-
ployed by the philosophers, but shall use only a few. In fact, 
man is divided into two parts only. For in man are the faculty 
of cognition (vis cognoscendi) and the faculty by which he either 
follows up or shuns those things which he has learned. The 
faculty of cognition is that by which we perceive or understand; 
by which we reason and mutually compare things and deduce con-
clusions, one after the other. The second part, or the faculty 
from which the affections take origin, is that by which we either 
resist or follow after the things known. This faculty is some-
times denominated will (voluntas), sometimes affection (affectlliW, 
sometimes appetite (appetitum) ." The Loci Communes of Philip 
Melanchthon, tr. Charles Leander Hill, Boston: Heador Publishing 
Company, 1944, p. 71. "••• internal affections are not within 
our power. For by experience and practice we have found out that 
the will of its ov.m accord cannot assume love, hate, or the like 
affection; but that one affection is conquered by another ••• • 
But what is the will if not the fountain of the affections." 
Ibid., p. 76. "If you refer the will to the affections [as 
opposed to actions], even from the point of view of natural judg-
ment there is plainly no liberty. Now when an affection has 
begun to rage and to burn, it cannot be restrained from bursting 
forth." Ibid., p. 81. 
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. h f A . 23 arbitrium, an idea wh~ch e got rom ugust~ne. The contrast 
is not between freedom and chance--the ontological 7ontrast, 
but between freedom and bondage--the manichaean contrast. Free-
dom is defined as obedience to God. Inability to obey God, then, 
is bondage, the inability to perform the functions prescribed by 
divine will. The fall of man rendered him incapable of free 
service to God, for both his cognitive and volitional faculties 
became defective. 
"Free will after the fall of Adam (or.after the commission of 
sin), is an empty name; when he [rr~n] does things for himself, he 
sins to the dea th. 1124 
Now Satan and man, being fallen and abandoned by 
God, cannot will good (that is, things that please 
God, or that God wills), but are ever turned in 
the direction of their own desires, so that they 
cannot but seek their own. This will and nature 
of theirs, thus turned from God, cannot be nothing, 
nor are Satan and ungodly man nothing; nor have they 
a nature and will that is nothing, though they cer-
tainly have a nature that is corrupt and turned 
from God. So that which we call the remnant of 
nature in the ungodly and in Satan, as being a 
23
rn Article 36 of his pamplet "Wider die Bulle des 
Endchrists", Latin title "Assertio omnium articulorum M. Lutheri, 
per bullam Leonis, X. novissima damna torum. 11 , written in response 
to the bull of excommunication in November, 1520, Luther quotes 
Augustine "contra Jul. book 2 11 as calling the "free will" of man 
servum arbitrium, because it is enslaved to Satan. This treatise 
served as the basis for Erasmus' attack upon Luther in his 
Diatribe. Luther responded with the treatise De Servo Arbitrio. 
Luther's SHmmtliche Schriften, XV, p. 1560. 
241£1Q., p. 1559 
,....-. 
creature and a work of God, is no less subject 
to Divine omnipotence and action than all the 
rest of God's creatures and works. Since God 
moves and works all in all, He moves and worki 
of necessity even in Satan and the ungodly. 
But He works according to what they are and 
what He finds them to be: which means, since 
they are evil and perverted themselves, that 
though they are impelled to action by this 
movement of Divine omnipotence they do only 
that which is perverted and evil.2) 
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The perversion of human nature, then, as indicated by Luther 
in this passage, involves a shifting of orientation of the entire 
personality from God-centeredness to self-centeredness. [We have 
already noted in Luther's interpretation of the fall of Satan the 
shift from God-centeredness to Satan himself as god. In a sense, 
on the human level Luther interprets the fall of man in essence 
as the same shift.] Eve set herself a.bove the command of God. 
She made herself to be the judge of God, imposing her standards 
on Him. 
If a human being is self-centered, there is no way whereby 
he can by his own effort escape continuing to be self-centered, 
for every act is an expression of self-centeredness. He is born 
that way and lives that way because he is not able to be anything 
other than what he is. His appropriate nature is to respond to 
the will of God, to be responsive to the activity of God. Since 
he cannot at the same time respond to God and to himself and, 
since all his actions are self-centered, he lives in continual 
25HA XVIII, p. 709. 
26 
opposition to God. 
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Luther refers to this bondage of self-involvement as the 
/ 
11 necess i ty of immutability". 
This is what we mean by necessity of immutability: 
that the will cannot change itself, nor give it-
self another bent, but, rather, is the more pro-
voked to crave the more it is opposed, as its 
chafing proves; for this would not occur, were 
it free or had liberum arbitrium.27 
Thus, one of the aspects of the human predicament is that it 
11~ mutare .!!.Qn possit11 , is not able to change itself. Perhaps 
even more devastating is a second aspect of this "necessity of 
immutability". 
26Luther, for instance, quotes Augustine in The Spirit 
and the Letter to the effect that "free will" without grace is 
worth nothing except to sin. Luther's SHmmtliche Schriften, XV, 
p. 1559. If man is turned from God, whether he knows it or not, 
he is under the domination of Satan. Apparently, what Luther 
also wants to argue is that the human being does not simply pay 
the consequences of his perversion by continuing to be what he 
is, but he becomes progressively worse. Luther dramatically 
declaims in a sermon: "Satan is the hellish rider, of \olhom the 
poets have spoken, who rides the poor soul and mind as his horse, 
and guides them wherever he wants, from one sin to another." 
Luther's SHmmtliche Schriften, XII, Sermon "Von den Besessenen" on 
Matt. 8:28-34, pp. 1562-1563. This sermon was delivered sometime 
in the year 1537. Luther is lamenting the plight of the man who 
wants to be a good man, but in his inability to be good becomes 
progressively tormented and tortured in soul and confused in mind 
at the disparity between his ethical standards and his actions. 
Luther concludes, "Where is then free will, a thing which is the 
prisoner of Satan. It isn't anything because it doesn't do any-
thing, but rather does everything according to the devil' s will." 
Luther's S~mmtliche Schriften, XV, pp. 1559-1560. 
27 WA XVIII, p. 634. 
I said, "of necessity"; I did not say "of compul-
sion"; I meant, by a necessity , not of compulsion, 
but of what they call immutability. That is to 
say; ~ !!:'2.!} without the Spirit .Qi God does .!!Q.! -do 
evil against his will, under pressure, as though 
he were taken by the scruff of the neck and dragged 
off against his will to puni~hmgnt; but he~ 1! 
spontaneously ~ voluntarily.2 
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Luther concludes, that since human beings are both unwilling 
and unable to be anything other than what they are, therefore, 
••• liberum arbitrium is an empty term whose 
reality is lost. A lost freedom, to my way of 
speaking, is no freedom at a 11, and to give the 
name freedom to something that has no freedom i~ . 
to apply to it a term that is empty of meaning. 9 
We, thus, have encountered, in a second sense, the notion 
of human liberum arbitrium as an empty term. For, if the human 
will is not able to will to be what it as a will ought to be, it 
is not free. It has no choice. It cannot and does not will to 
be different than it is. Hence, 1)because the omnipotence of God 
28 Idem. Underlining mine. Note also Luther's comment: 
"Scripture i'i1'deed sets forth man in such fashion that he not only 
is bound, miserable, confined, sick and dead, but he adds to his 
other miseries, through the operation of his ruler Satan, this 
misery of blindness: he believes that he is free, blessed, whole, 
powerful, healthy and alive. For if man were to know his miser-
able condition, Satan knows that he could not keep him in his 
rule. God could not fail to pity and to help misery which knew 
itself and cried out for help for He is proclaimed through all of 
scripture with great praise as being near those of contrite 
heart, ••• • Hence, the task of Satan is to maintain such a hoM 
on men that they never recognize their misery, but assume that 
they can do all things which they are claimed [to be able to do]. 
WA XVIII, p. 679. 
29Luther 1 s snmmtliche Schriften, XV, p. 1561. 
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is the sole and sufficient explanation of all that is, human 
beings cannot effectively will themselves to be, to continue to 
. / 
be or to cease to be and, 2) because of satanic domination, they 
cannot and do not will their wills to be different than they are. 
Divine Counter-Action 
Such a state of affairs, of course, God could not ignore, 
for, to permit it to continue unchecked would have resulted in 
the frustration of creative activity and the passing from 
existence of all that is. Divine omnipotence would be manipu-
lated by the satanic powers to bring about the destruction of the 
divine creation, for the omnipotence of God, as primary principle 
of all that is, maintains the existence of Satan. Such moving 
of the divine nature into opposition to itself is ontologically 
impossible. 
The opposite extreme to complete permissiveness is to remove 
this destructive power from existence. In discussing the 
question why evil actions occur when God is all powerful, Luther 
comments, 
God cannot suspend His omnipotence on account of 
man's perversion, ••• • In all this Satan con-
tinues to reign in peace; under this movement of 
Divine omnipotence he keeps his palace undis-
turbed.30 · 
I take Luther's comment here to mean this. For God to cause 
some entity to cease to be would be action contrary to God's 
30WA XVIII, p. 710. 
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creative nature: to give being to things. Satan is the cause of 
. . 
the destruction of being. God cannot act demonica~y. Therefore 
evil beings, having come into existence, the problem they consti-
tute cannot simply be solved by causing them not to exist. The 
divine response to the destructive satanic principle must fall 
between the extremes of complete permissiveness--which would lead 
to the complete frustration of divine creativeness--and the 
cessation of divine creativeness i.e., ceasing to preserve His 
creation, which is contrary to the divine nature. The middle 
role is creative intervention, divine action counter to the 
destructive activities of Satan, by a new continuous creation. 
Thus, a third principle of explanation for the operation of the 
universe, divine counter-action to the destructive operation of 
satanic forces, is proposed by Luther. God both preserves the 
defective operation of Satan and counter-acts it. On the one 
hand, everything which happens, both good and evil, co~tinues to 
be done by God ontologically, for God causes some things to 
happen by the deficient instrumentation of satanic forces. On 
the other hand, on the manichaean level, good is done by God, 
while evil is done by Satan. On the ontological level God is 
the cause of evil since He continues to pursue His course with 
means which have become defective. On the manichaean level Satan 
is responsible for evil as he endeavors to rob creation of its 
being. Meanwhile, God counteracts this influence by creating 
new being. 
~----~------------------------------~------------~ 
••• When God works in us, the will is changed under 
the sweet influence of the Spirit of God. Once 
more it desires and acts, not of compulsion, but 
of its own desires and spontaneous inclinations. 
Its bent cannot be altered by any oppositions; it 
cannot be mastered or prevailed upon even by the 
gates of hell; but it goes o~ willing, desiring and 
loving good~ just as once it willed, desired and 
loved evil.-'1 
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Since the nature of God is such that He cannot destroy what 
He has made, the divine counteractive influence is brought to 
bear on man, not by changing the motivations which are already 
there, but by creating additional motivations which arecentered 
on God as the good. Thus, the human being who is influenced by 
God experiences ne\-T feelings he has not experienced before and 
has in mind a new object to which to devote himself. The old 
objects and motivations remain, but th~y are not the primary 
objects and motivations. Luther describes such a human being as 
32 
simul iustus ~ peccator. He is capable of good and of evil 
for he feels both motivations. Since, then, he experiences 
conflicting emotions, he can act on either. Yet, since choice 
is determined by the stronger emotion and emotions are stirred 
up by God or Satan, the choice is not free. 
31wA XVIII, pp. 634-635. 
32For instance in the passage:- "Therefore, everyone who 
is justified [by God] is still a sinner." Luther's SMmmtliche 
Schriften, XIX, "Ftlnf Disputa tionen tlber R8m. 3, 28.", "Die-
dritte Disputation", 24, p. 1452. Compare also: "So a Christian 
is both righteous and a sinner at the same time, saint and per-
vert, opponent and son of God." Commentary .2.!2 Galatians, 
WA XXXX, I, p. 368. 
~ 
--------------------------------------------------------, 
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On the manichaean level, as on the ontological level, there 
is no function for human liberum arbitrium. Everything relative 
/ 
to human action is motivated either as the result of divine 
activity or of satanic activity. In a famous quotation, Luther 
says, 
Man's will is like a beast standing between two 
riders. If God rides, it wills and goes where God 
wills; as the Psalm says, 'I am become as a beast 
before thee, and I am ever with thee' [Ps. 73.22-3]. 
If Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan wills. 
Nor may it choose to which rider it will run, or 
which it will seek; but the riders th~mselves fight 
to decide who shall have and hold it. 3 
The ethical role of the man of God is a special kind of 
problem, for, unlike man in his original condition, strictly 
motivated by God and unlike man after the fall, strictly moti-
vated by Satan, the man of God experiences the effect of both 
divine and satanic influence. He is two persons, the old and the 
new. He does not stand neutrally between the two, able to go 
either way indiscriminately, but rather is, by grace na·turally 
reoriented again toward God. He identifies himself with his 
better nature, so that to act evilly would, as in the original 
act of human evil, be a turning away, an actus aversus from God. 
THE EXISTENTIAL IMPLICATION: HUMAN FREEDOM AND ACTION 
Is there any sense in which human action can be spoken of 
33 WA XVIII, p. 635. 
~·------------------~----------------------------------~ 
as arising from free choice? 
If we do not want to drop this term altogether 
[liberum arbitriurn]--which would realiy be the/ 
safest and most Christian thing to do--we may 
still in good faith teach people to use it to 
credit man with liberum arbitrium in respect, 
not of what is above him but of what is below 
him. That is to say, man should realize that 
in regard to his money and possessions he has 
a right to use them, to do or leave undone, 
according to his own "free will" - though that 
very "free will" is over-ruled by the liberum 
arbitriL~ Qf God alone, according to His own 
pleasure.34 
And though I should gra~t that liberum arbitrium 
by its endeavors can advance in some direction, 
namely, in the direction of good works, or the 
righteousness of the civil or moral law, yet it 
does not advance toward God's righteousness, nor 
does God deem its efforts in any respect ~Torthy 
to gain His righteousness; for He3 ~ays that His righteousness stands without law. 
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On this third level, then, finally we encounter a sense of 
34Ibid., p. 638. Bracketed mat~rial mine. 
35Ibid., pp. 767-768. Note also this remark by Luther: 
" ••• man falls under two kingdoms. In one he is guided by his own 
choice and counsel apart from precepts and mandates of God, that 
is with respect to things inferior to himself. Here he rules 
and is Lord, left in the hands of his own counsel. Not that 
God deserts him there in the sense that He does not cooperate 
in all things. But that He leaves to him a freedom for choosing 
and does not hem him in with any laws and prescriptions. And if 
you would use a paraphrase: The gospel leaves us in the hands of 
our mvn counsel that '\o.1e may rule over things and use them as we 
wish, ••• • In the other kingdom, however, [in relations with 
other persons and with God] man is not left in the hands of his 
own counsel, but is led and guided by the will and counsel of 
God, so that, just as in his own kingdom he is led by his own 
choice apart from the commands of another, so in the kingdom of 
God he is led by the precepts of another apart from his own 
choosing." l.Q.!£., p. 672. Bracketed material mine. 
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liberum arbitrium which, however limited it may be, is not 
36 
empty. 
/ 
36To clarify what Luther has in mind here, it may be of 
use to cite other quotations from works not directly the product 
of Luther himself but accepted by him. "If you estimate the 
power of the human will as touches its natural capacities accord-
ing to human reason, it cannot be denied but that there is in it 
a certain kind of liberty in things external. These are matters 
which you yourself might experience to be within your power, such 
as: to greet or not to greet a man; to put on certain attire or 
not to put it on; to eat meat or not to eat it as you will. Upon 
this contingency of external works those philosophers who attri-
buted freedom to the will, have fastened their eyes. In truth, 
however, because God does not look upon external works but upon 
the inner motions of the heart, Scripture has recorded nothing 
about such freedom. Those who do fashion their character by an 
external and affected affability teach this sort of freedom, 
especially the philosophers and the more recent theologians." 
Melanchthon, .Q.I!• ill•, pp. 75-76. "Of Free Will [sic] they [the 
Lutherans] teach that man's will has some liberty to choose civil 
righteousness, and to work things subject to reason ••• • These 
things are said in as many words by Augustine in his Hypognosti-
SQn, Book III: 1We grant that all ~~n have a free will, free 
inasmuch as it has the judgment of reason; not that it is thereby 
capable without God, either to begin, or, at least, to complete 
aught in things pertaining to God, but only in works of this 
life, whether good or evil. "Good" I call those works which 
spring from the good in nature, such as, willing to labor in the 
field, to eat and drink, to have a friend, to clothe oneself, to 
build a house, to marry a wife, to raise cattle, to learn divers 
useful arts, or whatever good pertains to this life. For all of 
these things are not without dependence on the providence of God; 
yea, of Him.and through Him they are and have their beginning. 
"Evil" I call such works as willing to worship an idol, to commit 
murder, etc.'" "Article XVIII: Of Free Will", Augsburg Confes-
sion, Concordia Triglot, The Symbolical Books of the Ev. Lutheran 
Church, ed. F. Bente, St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1917, 
pp. 50-53. "The human will has liberty in choice of works and 
things which reason comprehends by itself. It can to a certain 
extent render civil righteousness or the righteousness of works; 
it can speak of God, offer to God a certain service by an outward 
work, obey magistrates, parents; in the choice of an outward work 
it can restrain the hands from murder, from adultery, from theft. 
Since there is left in human nature reason and judgment concerning 
objects subjected to the senses, choice between things and the 
i ir' 
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There is a kind of human liberum arbitrium, not because the 
human will is free, but because human powers of cognition are 
. / 
free. Man is able to summon up images, to make deductions, to 
determine implications, etc., to which he himself responds. He 
is able to hold in his consciousness more than one alternative 
which interests him. He can use his strength and imagination to 
subdue the earth. He is limited in imagination and cognition, 
since the fall. He can be stirred up to act against his better 
judgment. He can enter into whatsoever external relationship he 
wills with his fellows. He is limited only by his ingenuity and 
interests. He cannot terminate his own being nor can he summon 
up any emotions other than those that of their own accord rise 
up within him. And even if he takes steps by the development of 
good habits and a regular life to control and direct his impulses 
he has no guarantee that at any time, often when least expected, 
there will not rise up within him impulses alien to what he 
liberty and power to render civil righteousness are also left. 
For Scripture calls this the righteousness of the flesh which the 
carnal nature, i.e., reason, renders by itself, without the Holy 
Ghost, a 1 though the pov1er of concupiscence is such that men more 
frequently obey evil dispositions than sound judgment. And the 
devil, who is efficacious in the godless, as Paul says, Eph. 2,2 
does not cease to incite this feeble nature to various offenses. 
These are the reasons why even civil righteousness is rare among 
men, as we see that not even the philosophers themselves, who 
seem to have aspired after this righteousness, attained it." 
"Article XVIII: Of Free Will", Apology .2f Augsburg Confession, 
Concordia Triglot, pp. 334-335. 
.!j 
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wishes to be or to do. 37 
37An elaboration of the capacity of this limited notion 
of hlli~n liberum arbitrium constitutes the bulk of chapter IV and 
is interwoven into chapter v. 
CHAPTER III 
DETERMINIS.H AND ACTION--THE PROBLEN OF JUSTICE 
In the development of a thought structure, be it the formu-
lation of a political constitution, a social procedure, a game 
or a philosophic worldview such as occupies these pages, the 
theorist, if he is to do an adequate job must at minimum 1) set 
forth the structure clearly, exhibiting its essential elements 
and their relationships and 2) test the structure for internal 
contradictions and inconsistencies. The former activity oecupies 
chapter II. The latter is the task of chapter III. 
Since Luther views reality as activity occuring on three 
levels, but comprehended in and determ.ined by the first leve 1, 
God exercising the power of liberum arbitrium, Luther's task, set 
forth in this chapter, is to justify that activity in relation 
to what occurs on the other levels. Inasmuch as the approach 
culminates in the development of an ethical structure, as opposed 
to a scientific structure, chapter II centers on the origin of 
good and evil; this chapter centers on the justice of divine 
determinism particularly as it relates to human action. For 
purposes of order in the chapter Luther's arguments are grouped 
under four heads, each representing a separate challenge to the 
adequacy of Luther's approach. The first challenge limits itself 
to the ontological level {but in so doing treats all the levels 
universally, since they can be reduced to the first level), 
~ ~-------------------------------------------
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claiming simply that God is unjust. The seconc <'tge pro-
poses that there is an inconsistency between the L .ogical 
/ 
activity of God and the view of God as loving man re,realed by God 
in His activity on the manichaean level: in brief that what God 
claims He is and what He does are not in agreement. The third 
challenge proposes that there is an inconsistency between the 
manichaean and the existential levels. The demands which God 
makes upon man in His law exceed man's capacity to fulfill them. 
The fourth challenge proposes an inconsistency between the 
existential and the ontological levels. Human action does not 
consistently receive its just consequences in rewards and punish-
ments from God. Good is not always rewarded with good and evil 
with evil. 
Since these four challenges exhaust the number of relation-
ships which the activity of divine liberum arbitrium has in the 
structure of Luther's thought and since the structure is reduc-
ible to that activity, if each challenge is successfully refuted, 
the structure is internally consistent. 
CHALLENGE ONE: THE JUSTICE OF GOD 
So many men of great ability who have stood the test 
of time ••• demand that God should act according to 
human right [iure humano] and do what seems right to 
them or He should cease to be God. The secrets of 
His majesty shall profit Him nothing; let Him render 
a reason why He should be God or why He wills what 
has no appearance of justice--as if you would ask 
Mr. Shoemaker or Mr. Beltrnaker to sit in judgment! 
Flesh does not dignify God with so much glory as to 
believe that He is just and good when He speaks and 
acts above and beyond what the Justinian Code has 
laid down or the fifth book of Aristotle. Let the 
majesty, Creator of all things, submit Himself to 
one of His creatures .1 / 
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The questioning of the justice of divine action presupposes 
that human standards hold for God. Since God is above all rules 
and is Himself the rule for all, the presupposition is falla-
cious.2 11 If His justice would be such that it could be judged 
just by human reckoning, clearly it would not be divine and would 
differ in no way from human justice. 113 
Secondly, a challenge to the justice of God in a particular 
case assumes that one knows the mind of God, that one knows God's 
intent. 11 Since He is the one and true God, therefore totally 
incomprehensible and inaccessible to human reason, it follows, 
yea, it is necessary that also His justice be incomprehensible 
••• •
114 Again, the challenge rests on a fallacious assumption. 5 
1 WA XVIII, p. 729. 2 . 
Compare the passage cited in Chapter II, pages 36-37. 
"God is He for Whose will there is no cause or rationale which 
prescribes for Him any sort of rule or measurement, since there 
is nothing equal or superior to Him, but rather He Himself is the 
rule for everything. Ibid., p. 712. 
3!lli.' p. 784. 
4 Idem. 
5
compare also: "••• concerning that secret will of 
Majesty there can be no debate and human temerity must be recalloo 
and restrained, which, in continual preversity, ignoring neces-
sary matters, always seeks after and assails it, nor should it 
occupy itself with the scrutiny of that secret majesty which 
cannot be reached, inasmuch as it dwells in inaccessible light, 
by the testimony of Paul. 11 [I Tim. 6:16] .!..£.i..Q., p. 689. 
I 
~--------------------------------~ 
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Questions like "Does God act justly?" or its opposite "Does 
God act unjustly?" have the appearance of rneaningf~lness. If, 
hmY"ever, we substitute for the term "God" in each question an 
expression which for Luther would. be equivalent "He Who always 
acts justly", the questions are, respectively, tautological and 
self-contradictory, for the former asks "Does He Who always acts 
justly act justly?" while the latter asks "Does He Who always 
acts justly act unjustly?" 
In summary, then, challenges to the justice of God involve 
fallacious assumptions, and arise from an inadvertent mislocation 
of the ontological level of divine activity, reducing it to the 
existential level. 
CHALLENGE TWO: DIVINE WORD AND WORK 
A second challenge to the justice of God arises from the 
apparent inconsistency between God's revelation of Himself in 
Scripture and in the incarnation of Jesus as concerned for people 
and loving all of them, and the deliberate damnation of some 
people to eternal torment. The inconsistency is epitomized by 
Christ's weeping over Jerusalem. "It is the will of the same 
God incarnate to weep, deplore and groan over the lost state of 
the impious as that of the divine Majesty which on purpose 
leaves and rejects some so that they perish." 6 God purports both 
6Ibid., pp. 689-690. 
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to abandon some deliberately and at the same time to mourn their 
loss. / 
No doubt this offends to the highest degree common 
sense of natural reason, that God wilfully [~ 
voluntate ~] should desert, harden and damn people, 
as though He delighted in sins and such great and 
eternal torment of wretches, He Who is publicly 
proclaimed as full of mercy and goodness, etc. It 
seems iniquitous, cruel, and intolerable so to think 
of God. This has been a great offense to so many 
great men through the ages ••• • For this reason 
such sweating and labor has been devoted to exonerate 7 the goodness of God by blaming the will of man, ••• 
• 
The effort to which Luther alludes in the last sentence can 
be expressed simply by the following formal argument. 
Proposition 1: The just will of God is the cause of all that 
happens. 
Proposition 2: Some men suffer the evil of eternal damnation. In 
order to preserve the justice of God and to keep Him blameless of 
the damnation of the reprobate a third proposition is proposed: 
Proposition 3: Men do good and evil of their own free will. 
Luther argues that this set of three propositions is not 
consistent. It is an antilogism. The third proposition is inco~ 
sistent with the first. For if men act freely, those acts are a 
limitation on the freedom of God, which is impossible. 8 It 
follows, then, that an appeal to human free will is inadequate 
to resolve the problem. Because proposition 1 is true, 3 has to 
71QiS., p. 719. 
8
see quotation 14, chapter II, pp. 36-37. 
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be false. 9 
The question of the apparent inconsistency between 1 and 2 
/ 
is resolved by Luther in this fashion. We have no claims on God, 
since we are His creatures, but He has full rights against us to 
demand whatsoever He pleases. "No injury is done to us since God 
owes us nothing. He has received nothing from us and He has 
promised us nothing except as much as He has willed and please~'l 
Damnation follm-.•s as a natura 1 consequence of the condition of 
the impious. The only escape from damnation is by divine inter-
vention, but no one has a right to this. Hence, whatever God 
d H . . . h 11 oes, 1s act1ons are r1g teous. 
Since God has rights relative to man but man has no rights 
relative to God, God is not limited by the principles of recip-
rocal and distributive justice. The principle of equality, 
however, is not nullified by the fact that there are no human 
rights relative to God. Does one have a right to expec:t equa 1 
treatment from God as someone else? If no one is any more or 
9John Calvin was influenced by Luther's argument in 
the development of his own theology. He attempted to remove the 
force of the apparent inconsistency between 1 and 2 by arguing 
that the damnation of the impious contributes to the glory of 
God. Unlike Luther, he developed a double predestination theory 
to explain justification and damnation. Like Luther he denied 
the truth of 3. Cf. Calvin's Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, in particular Book II, chapter vand Book III, chapter 
XXI. 
IOWA XVIII, p. 717. 
11God is bound by His promises and can be held to them. 
These, of course, are rights bestowed by God rather than arising 
from the nature of the divine/human relationshi • 
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less deserving of grace than anyone else, why does God save some 
and not others? Why does He deal unequally with men? 
/ 
The issue is legitimate. The questions are reasonable, but, 
under present conditions, unanswerable to human satisfaction. 
\..Jhat is at issue is divine consistency. If X and Y are two 
individuals between whom, before God, there is no difference, 
since both lack rights, if God acts in manner m toward X why does 
He not act in manner m toward Y? To claim that God ought to act 
in manner m toward Y would be presumptuous, for it would assume 
that Y has a right to be treated in manner m by God (which right 
Y does not have) or that God is duty bound to treat all men alik~ 
Since God can act however He pleases, the latter alternative is 
patently false. He cannot, however, act arbitrarily. God is 
bound by the necessity of unchangeability. 
Luther distinguishes between God's hidden and revealed will 
to resolve the issue. The distinction is roughly between the 
will of God operative on the ontological level and on the 
manichaean level. Only the operation on the manichaean level is 
revealed by God. God exhibits Himself as loving men, as hating 
and overcoming evil, etc. He does not, however, reveal His 
overarching ontological order whereby He reconciles good and evil 
and unifies in purposeful fashion the creative and destructive 
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principles in the universe. 12 The attempt to learn why some are 
saved and not others transcends the limits of human competence 
/ 
and comprehension and results in confusion. One is faced with 
the sheer will of God, with pure divine impulses, which will be 
understood first in eternity when God is seen face to face. 13 
CHALLENGE THREE: VALIDITY OF THE ETHICAL "OUGHT" 
Insofar as divine determinism relates to the manichaean and 
existential levels of Luther's thought structure, the problem of 
justice revolves primarily around the question of human moral 
responsibility. Implicit in the argument counter to Luther's 
position is the principle that moral obligation implies the 
1211 
••• God works evil in us,.that is, through us, not 
as a fault (culpa) of God, but because of our defectiveness, who, 
since we are by nature evil, but God is truly good, impelling 
(rapiens) us to action by his own action according to the nature 
of His omnipotence, is not able to do anything other than that He 
Himself as good does evil because of an evil instrument, granted 
that He by means of His wisdom uses this evil well for His glory 
and our salvation." WA XVIII, p. 711. 
13A • · • th 1 . 1 . 1· . nt1c1pat1ng e natura 1mpu se to reJect 1m1ts to 
human competence, Luther remarks, "Indeed, here Reason will say 
in her nosy and talkative fashion, 'That's a nice escape hatch 
we've invented for ouself, that whenever we are hard pressed by 
the force of arguments we run back to that awe-inspiring will of 
Majesty and where our adversary has been troublesome we reduce 
him to silence no differently than the astrologers who with the 
invention of their "epicycles" elude all questions about the 
motion of the entire heavens.• We answer that it not our inven-
tion, but a precept founded on the divine scriptures~' Ibid., 
p. 690. ----
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ability to do what is necessary to discharge the obligation. 14 
There is an inconsistency between the demands which God makes of 
. / 
man in divine law, revealed as part of the recreative activity 
of God on the manichaean level, and the human capacity to act, 
exhibited on the existential level. Men are commanded by God to 
love Him and one another. They are incapable of such motivation 
in their fallen condition. Is God justified in laying such an 
obligation upon them? Or does their inability to discharge the 
obligation excuse them from it? Luther argues that inability 
does not excuse. His argument rests on an analysis of lin-
guistic usage. 
Both grammarians and boys on street corners are aware 
that nothing more is signified by words in the imper-
ative mood than that which ought to be done. What, 
14Augustine, to whom both free-will and anti-free-will 
advocates have appealed at various times in the history of the 
Church, is ambiguous on the topic treated in this section. He 
says, for instance, in the treatise On Grace !!.!!Q ~ R!.ll, "Now 
God has revealed through His Holy Scriptures that there is 
liberum arbitrium in man. Hm-1 He has revealed this I cannot 
recount in human language, but in divine. First of all, God's 
commands would be useless to man unless he had liberum arbitrium, 
so that by executing them [the commands] he would obtain the 
promised rewards." This passage appears to be in opposition to 
Luther. On the other hand, in the same treatise Augustine says, 
"There is a liberurn arbitrium always within us, but it is not 
always good, for it is either free from righteousness when it is 
in bondage to sin--then it is wicked--or else it is free from sin 
when it is in bondage to righteousness--then it is good." This 
passage appears to support Luther. A readily available English 
translation of Augustine's treatise is found in Volume I of 
Whitney J. Oate~ Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1948. The passages cited are found on pages 
734 and 758. 
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however is done or is able to be done must be treated 
by indicative verbs. How does it happen, the~ that 
you theologians are twice as inept as boys, in/that 
as soon as you catch hold of one imperative verb you 
proceed to infer an indicative, as though as soon as 
something is commanded it necessarily is done or can 
be done.IS 
Hume several centuries later argued the impossibility of 
d . i . f . d. i 16 de uc~ng an mperat~ve rom an ~n ~cat ve. Luther is arguing 
against the possibility of deducing an indicative from the 
legitimacy of an imperative. Capacity to act does not follow 
necessarily from obligation to act. Therefore, it is not unjust 
for God to impose obligations which cannot be fulfilled. 
On what does the "obligation implies ability" principle 
rest? On the function of language: it would be foolish or absurd 
to issue commands if those who heard them would not be able to 
15wA XVIII, p. 677. Luther is referring here to 
Erasmus' argument that scripture passages containing divine 
commands prove that men have liberum arbitrium. For if men have 
the obligation, then they must have the ability to discharge what 
God commands. 
16
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto 
met with, I have always rernark'd, that the author proceeds for 
some time in the -ot,d inary way of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the 
copulations of propositions, "is" and "is not", I meet with no 
propositions that is not connected with an 11 ought11 or an "ought 
not". This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last 
consequence. For as this "ought" or "ought not", expresses some 
new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou 1 d be 
observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should 
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely 
different from it." Book III, section i, of A Treatise of Human 
Nature. The passage is found on page 469 of the ~. A. Selby-
Bigge edition, Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1951. 
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obey them. The mistaken assumption of this argument., however, is 
that command-type language has only one function, t? secure the 
fulfillment of its content. Luther argues that imperatives have 
a variety of functions. 
Do we not very frequently make evident impotence and 
impossibility by such ways of speaking? As, for 
instance, 11 If you want to equal Virgil in singing, 
my 1'-faevius, other songs are needed." 11 If you want 
to surpass Cicero, Scotus, you need to replace your 
cunning with the highest eloquence • 11 ''If yoti want 
to be compared with David, you need to give birth 
to similar psalms. 11 Here clearly are indica ted 
things impossible for average abiliti~s, granted 
that they all can be accomplished by divine powers. 
The same holds true in scriptural matters: by such 
assertions is pointed out what can be done in us 17 by the power of God, but we cannot do it ourselves. 
The apparent inconsistency between the manichaean and the 
existential levels of activity resulting in a state of apparent 
injustice can be exhibited by the following antilogism. From the 
manichaean level comes the command of God to man: Lovel The 
existential fact of the matter is that one cannot just.turn 
particular emotions on and off. Emotions are not under our 
direct control Divine love, such as is ~ommanded by God, over 
and beyond this, must be generated in us by God. These two 
states of affairs are represented by the following propositions: 
17
wA XVIII, p. 691. Compare also: "For this reason the 
words of the law are spoken [by God], not to affirm a power of 
the will, but to illuminate blind reason, that it may see that 
its own light is nothing and that there is no strength [virtus] 
of will. 'By the law is the knowledge of sin', says Paul; he 
does not say the abolition or avoidance of sin." Ibid., p. 677. 
Proposition 1: Men are to love God and their neighbor. 
Proposition 2: Emotions are not subject to human control. 
/ 
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Because of the opposition between the two propositions a 
third is sometimes suggested: 
Proposition 3: Obligation implies the ability to discharge it. 
The three propositions form an antilogism. At least one is 
false. Given the truth of 3, proposition 1 is false. 18 
If propositions 1 and 3 are taken as true, 2 is false. 
Erasmus, at least in the fashion Luther interpreted his argument, 
opted for this approach in the famous debate between the two men. 
The approach is faced with extreme difficulties. It is workable 
so long as divine commands are interpretable as requiring par-
ticular actions, or if, in divine cornmqnds involving personal 
motivation, terms denoting emotions can be replaced with terms 
denoting actions, e. g., if "love" can be defined in behavioral 
terms. But if this cannot be done, the approach must directly 
oppose the meaning and implications of proposition 2 and assert, 
contrary to generally accepted psychological fact, that one can 
at will summon up particular motivations. 
18This direction is taken with variations by the early 
twentieth century deontologists, Ross, Prichard, and Sidgwick. 
An excellent analysis of the Decalogue using this argumentation 
is found in the tenth chapter of G. E. Hoore 1 s book, Philosophical 
Studies, entitled "The Nature of M>oral Philosophy". New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1922. It was later republished as a 
Harbrace paperback volume. 
I. 
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Luther accepted the truth of propositions 1 and 2. Conse-
quently, he, of necessity, rejected 3 as false. Th? implications 
of his approach are at least twofold: the scope of the ethical 
"ought" covers both action and motivation and, because men apart 
from the activity of Qod cannot be properly motivated, they can-
not fulfill their obligations to God, of and by themselves. The 
practical function of the ethical "ought", then, is not to pre-
scribe behavior, but to reveal the incapacity of men to act as 
they ought. Luther, thus, is committed to a motivational ethic, 
the demands of which require divine involvement. 
\-/hat of the apparent inconsistency between propositions 1 
and 2. They are inconsistent only if 3 is assumed_ to be true. 
If obligation is not limited by the ability to fulfill it, then 
there is no inconsistency. 
CHALLENGE FOUR: HUMAN ACTION AND DIVINE RESPONSE 
The final relationship which needs examination is that 
between the existential and the ontological, the divine rewarding 
and punishing of humans acts which are good and bad. The general 
rationale of the ontological operation of the universe follows 
this pattern. Actions have their appropriate consequences which 
follow naturally and necessarily. "If you sink in water you will 
suffocate; if you swim out you will be saved. 1119 In contrast 
to these are what might be called moral consequences. Here a 
19 WA XVIII, p. 693. 
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distinction must be made between the worthiness of the actor and 
the worth of the act. Since the worthiness of the actor is 
/ 
determined by his motivation and, since he has no control over 
his motives, but is motivated either by God or Satan, there is no 
worth which is earned by the actor. We are, thus, limited to the 
consequences of actions. Actions are done either under compul-
sion or not under compulsion. There is neither reward or punish-
ment for acts done under compulsion. Of acts not done under com-
pulsion, if they are done willingly, reward or punishment follows 
depending on whether they are good or bad acts. The fact that 
one cannot change the nature of his will is irrelevant. In the 
determination of temporal rewards and punishments, then, God is 
guided by the goodness or evilness of the act whether it was done 
willingly or not. He is not guided by the motivation of the 
actor. The reward or punishment is meted out in this present 
life. In contrast to this, the relationship which obtains in 
eternity be~~een God and men is determined by the motivational 
relationship which obtains between God and men at the time of 
exit from this life. Moral consequences follow with the same 
20 
necessity as natural consequences. 
It does not take much experience of life to discover that 
there is an inconsistency between this rationale and what happens 
20Ibid., pp. 693-694. 
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as a consequence of human behavior. The lament about the pros-
pering of the wicked and the suffering of the innocent is an 
/ 
ancient and oft repeated refrain. Luther reconciles the incon-
sistency by an appeal to the life to come. "There is a life 
after this life, in which, whatever is not punished and remu-
nerated here will be punished and remunerated there, for this 
life is nothing but a precursor or rather a beginning of a future 
life. 1121 
In this fashion Luther justifies the structure of his 
system, reconciling the levels of activity with one another. He 
argues that much of what happens in life requires divine enlight-
enment for us to reconcile it with what we experience. Even the~ 
there is that which transcends our comprehension and, as a result 
must be taken on faith. 
Three lights are behind me: the light of nature, the 
light of grace, the light of glory. In the light of 
nature it cannot be resolved how it is just for the 
good to be afflicted and the evil to fare well. But 
the light of grace has resolved it. In the light of 
grace it cannot be resolved how God can damn him who 
is not able with any of his powers but to sin and to 
be a prisoner. Here both the light of nature and the 
light of grace say that the fault is not that of the 
miserable man, but the injustice of God for they are 
not able to judge otherwise of a God who crowns the 
impious man freely, without merit and does not crown 
another but damns him who is perhaps less, certainly 
not more, impious. But the light of glory tells a 
21 Ibid., p. 785. 
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different story and someday will point out God, "'hose 
judgment alone is of incomprehensible justice, as a 
God manifestly the justest of the just, prov~ed that 
in the meantime we believe it, warned and strengthened 
by the example of how the light of grace in similar 
fashion explains that which is a mystery for the 
light of nature.2 
22 Idem 
CHAPTER IV 
ACTIONS AND MOTIVATION--THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LUTHE~ 1 S ETHICS 
The isolation in Chapter II of a sense of human liberum 
arbitrium which is not empty demonstrates the possibility of an 
ethic. Its morphology has not yet been exhibited. Since 
Luther's ontological thought structure has developed theocentri-
cally, it is necessary at this point to reapproach it anthropo-
centrically in order to expose the principles which underlie 
Luther's ethic. 
Luther's view of reality is structured by the ruler/ruled 
relationship. ~Ian stands in the midst of the hierarchy of being 
Superior to him are God and the good and evil angels. Inferior 
to him are animals, plants and inanimate things. According to 
the original order of perfection a descending order of command 
coupled with an ascending order of obedience would guarantee the 
peaceful and harmonious operation of the whole realm of creation. 
This perfection is marred by the demonic interference with the 
ontological operation of the universe and exhibits itself by the 
manichaean dialectic. 
While man modifies that which lies beneath him by imposing 
his force externally upon it, he himself is modified both 
externally and internally by those forces which are above him. 
Because the connection between divine activity and human ethical 
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behavior is found in inner motivation1 the transition from 
ontology to ethics can be made in two ·stages: 1) fro~ ontology to 
psychology by an examination of the relation of divine activity 
to human motivation and 2) from psychology to ethics by an exami-
nation the relation of divine motivating to human ethical action. 
ACTION AND HOTIVATION 
God acts in two distinctive ways: creatively and prescrip-
tively. The creative activity of God, as we have previously 
indicated, is also of two sorts: original ontological creativity 
whereby entities are brought into being and preserved in their 
being, and re-creative activity to counteract demonic damage. 
Luther speaks of the two expressions of the will of God, partic-
ularly exhibited in His verbal revelation of Himself, as law and 
gospel. 2 In the narrow sense, gospel tends to be restricted to 
re-creative activity and is, thus, properly restricted to the 
manichaean level of meaning. If, however, one interprets the 
notion of gospel more broadly as the expression of divine good-
ness, i.e., all divine creative activity, it becomes apparent 
1 . 
Luther uses the ty~o verbs, agere and rapere to des-
cribe this activity of inner "moving". The former verb is used 
most frequently in the active voice to describe divine or demonic 
activity. The latter verb is usually used passively to describe, 
from a human experiential standpoint "being moved". For Luther's 
interpretation of the relation of these two verbs see footnote 5 
of this chapter. Note than he says: agi=rapi. 
2For Luther's treatment of the topic see WA XVIII, 
pp. 680-684. 
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that on all three levels of Luther's view of reality, the onto-
logical, the manichaean and the existential, God e~presses Him-
self both in the form of law and of gospel. Since God relates 
Himself to man both externally and internally, there are, thus, 
six distinguishable ways whereby God expresses Himself as law and 
six as gospel, two of each on each of three levels. 3 
The Activit~ .Q.f Q.Q.g !t§_ Law 
On the ontological level the outer expression of the will of 
God is evident in the apparent purposefulness, order and regu-
larity of the operation of the universe. While it is not possi~e 
rationally to apprehend God as the opera tor nor his ends, it is 
possible to derive from experience patterns of regularity in the 
universe and to express them in the form of natural laws and to 
develop natural sciences. Since the will of God, functioning as 
liberum arbitriurn, is unknowable, whatever is discovered as 
3viewed in theological terms the three levels of divine .· 
activity correspond to the distinctive activities of the Father, 
the Son and the Holy Spirit of the Trinity. Due to the nature of 
the theological problems with which Luther found himself forced 
to deal, his theological formulations developed in greatest 
detail matters having to do with the manichaean level, the 
activity of the Son. Subsequent Lutheran theology has tended to 
follow in the same pattern. Hence, the ontological level and the 
existential level of Luther's philosophic world view remain to 
this day relatively undeveloped, although in recent years, since 
World War II, due to the influence of existentialism on Lutheran 
thought there has been some exploration of these areas by Barth, 
Tillich and others. 
'c 
'c 
.... ,, 
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natural law is not identical with God's expression of His will as 
law but follows from the fact that He does so expreJs it. That 
is to say, regularities are apprehended because God acts con-
sistently. 
The inner ontological expression of the will of God is 
exhibited by the existence of a sense of right and wrong and the 
activity of conscience. We have natural feelings of disapproval 
and guilt. These arise from what Luther and Melanchthon call 
~naturae, laws of our nature. 4 
On the manichaean level, part of the activity of God as law 
is the clear expression of His will in Scripture, notably in the 
ten commandments. God also presents Himself in the consciousness 
of people who have encountered His revelation of Himself in 
Scripture as one to be loved or as a reason for loving one's 
fellows. Because He rises up into consciousness as an alter-
native to self-love He is naturally resisted and hated, or, at 
best is modified to serve, not as an ultimate object of affection 
4From these natural sources come what men naturally 
feel about morality. Of the duty to love God there is just a 
trace of awareness. Because of it societies tend to produce 
religions. They feel a need to have a deity. The demands of the 
second table of the law are ~ore clearly sensed. Luther claims 
that one tends not to find a society where killing is permitted 
within the society, adultery is sanctioned, disobedience to 
authority is permitted or theft tolerated. They are inimical to 
the existence of a viable society. Men seem spontaneously to 
"know" that such behavior is wrong. The actions bother, exercise 
or anger them. See also Melanchthon, .212• cit., "On Law", pp. 
110-117. 
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but as a pattern of action. He is reduced to a purely paradig· 
rnatic function, a moral example. / 
Finally, on the existential level God expresses Himself as 
law externally by the goodness of the lives of the converted and 
internally in their consciousness and in their expression of His 
motivation towards others. 
~ Activity of God ~ Gospel 
The creative ontological activity of God is expressed by the 
dynamic persistence of the universe and the integrity and order 
which it exhibits. Internally it is experienced in the sense 
of well·being, harmony, health, pleasure and contentment. On the 
manichaean level the re-creative activity of God has been 
expressed historically and is retained in verbal form in the 
salvation history of the Old and New Testament, culminating in 
the incarnation of God Himself in history, leaving behind Himself 
through history the verbal and sacramental records and reve· 
lations of Himself. Internally He presents Himself to men's 
consciousnesses as the Holy One of God. Finally, on the existen-
tial level God expresses His goodness externally in the continual 
creation and preservation of the Church, Whose presence is 
detected in certain outward ways, by the use of Word and sacra· 
ments, and the expression of divine motivation in behavior. 
Inwardly one is aware of the testimony of the Spirit in moving 
~ 
r ------------------------~----------------------------~ 
78 
one to act. 5 Thus, in multiform ways God makes His presence 
known in motivating His creation to activity. / 
The Demonic Motivation of Men 
Since human beings are divinely created, they are creatures 
of purpose. Inasmuch, however, as they are born ignorant of God, 
incapable of loving God and directed toward evil, they lack the 
purpose of their existence. Hence, consciously or not, each, 
from infancy attempts to make sense out of his existence in order 
that he can achieve a purpose, for he cannot live a meaningless 
existence. Lacking the knowledge of his subjection to God, he 
unconsciously becomes his own god, blindly aping the example of 
Satan his master, in seeking to be a self to which all else is 
subject. The image is that of a spoiled child. " ••• man is 
captive and corrupt, at the same time conceitedly having a very 
high opinion of himself and ignorant of his own corruption and 
. . "6 capt~v~ty. 
5Note Luther's comment, "Christian, indeed are moved 
(aguntu~} not by liberum arbitrium but by the Spirit of God, 
Romans 8. To be moved (a~i) indeed is not to move (agere) but 
to be impelled (rapi} just as a saw or an axe is moved by a 
carpenter." WA XVIII, p. 699. Since, of course, man possesses 
choice over those things beneath him, unlike sa,.;rs and axes, the 
analogy extends only to the notion of being moved. 
6
rbid., p. 674. Compare also: "The ungodly man (as we 
have said), like his prince Satan, is totally turned to himself 
and to his own things. He doesn't look for God, nor does he care 
for the things of God; he seeks his own riches, his own glories, 
his own works, his own wisdom, his own power, his own kingdom, 
someone opposes him or wants to lessen any of them in the least, 
completely his own--and he wants to enjoy it in peace. But if j 
by that same perverted drive [aversione] by which he seeks those 
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By nature his existence rests on demonic foundations, for 
he is incapable of loving God. Hence, his inner na;:ure is 
irrational, impulsive and quixotic, infantile and belligerent. 
He is at odds with himself and his world, emotional and sub-
jective. His springs of action arise to consciousness from 
demonic sources. Although he does not create his spr :i.ngs of 
action he can use his cognitive powers to interpret them, to 
select the means and manner of carrying out the courses of 
action to which they impel him or to examine the implications of 
the actions to which he is drawn. The structure of the situation 
can be exhibited by the Aristotelian practical syllogism. The 
end and the impetus to the act, the major term, comes into con-
sciousness either from satanic or divine sources. The present 
situation is the minor term. Man mediates the situation, using 
his liberum arbitrium, by discovering the practical middle term, 
the means of getting from the present situation to the desired 
end. If he is torn between conflicting impulses he can weigh the 
alternatives and assemble the relevant factors; other alter-
natives may occur to him. Finally, either one alternative 
carries the field and is acted upon or he is frozen between 
things, he is also moved and irritated and he rages against his 
adversary. And he is no more capable of ceasing to rage than he 
is of ceasing to desire or seek those things. And he can no more 
cease to desire things for himself than he can cause himself not 
to exist since he is still a creature of God, albeit a spoiled 
one." p. 710. 
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opposed and equal inner forces. 
Any impulse which rises to consciousness is either directly 
or indirectly satisfied or it is frustrated. But neither drive 
satisfaction or drive frustration provide satisfactory solutions 
to the total human situation. Since natural human impulses are 
defective, rising from a demonic source and directed to inferior 
ends, the satisfying of the drive simply results in the attain-
ment of ends which are inadequate. The perverted condition is 
reinforced by the success of· the act. 
If in some way the drive is frustrated, reinforcement of the 
perverted condition is avoided, but no remedy for the condition 
out of which the perverted drive arose is achieved. In addition, 
the future capacity to act may be endangered and unwanted side 
effects of unpredictable behavior stemming from drive frustra-
tion may occur. Thus, although one may be able to achieve an 
orderly and meaningful outward pattern of behavior, one cannot 
by oneself resolve the internal problems of ones natural per-
verted condition. 
The Divine Motivation Qi ~ 
God must intervene to solve the human predicament, both to 
become the source of movement and the end of human existence. 
Such intervention, as we have previously indicated, is resisted. 
Since the advances of God encounter increased perversity [Luther 
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describes it as hardenss of heart,J 7 God cannot merely present 
Himself in consciousness as a possible object of a~ection or 
exhibit therein the idea of an action pleasing to Him, for such 
objects and ideas will be rejected. He must move the psyche 
itself in order that it will respond positively to such impulses 
and ideas, i.e., He must convert the psyche itself to Himself. 
Since God creates being but does not destroy it, the former 
human nature remains after God gives the psyche a new nature, 
although the new nature dominates the old. The manichaean con-
flict which prior to conversion is external to the individual 
(since he is totally under demonic control) is now internalized. 
The converted human being experiences impulses both from God and 
Satan and is attracted to each, according to his separate nature& 
Whereas previously if he experienced both sorts of impulses he 
was attracted to the one and repelled by the other and, in this 
respect, experienced no problems, now divine ideas rise to his 
consciousness, clothed in attractiveness; but, for that matter, 
so do satanic. He acts on both sorts, depending on which gains 
the ascendency. While his prime mover is divine and he accord-
ingly searches for ways he can give expression to this motivatio~ 
he still retains his old perverted habit patterns and can return 
to his old ways of acting. 
7Note in particular Luther's explanation of hardness of 
heart in the case of Pharaoh. WA XVIII, p. 711. 
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One would expect a deterministic ontology to entail a 
closed psychology. Because of the manichaean level/in Luther's 
worldview, there is a surprising openness on the psychological 
level. Man not only is plastic, developing and changing as a 
personality, he is also unpredictable. Novel springs of action 
can well up within him in surprising and unexpected ways. He is 
capable of abrupt personality change, e.g., in conversion. Hence, 
one who is responsive both to divine and satanic influences finds 
himself upon occasion confronted in consciousness with novel 
ideas and courses of action attractively presented which are 
shocking, abhorrent, or thrillingly exciting. From this well-
S 
spring of originality flow great ideas and original art. Even 
human beings of supposed limited capacity are capable under 
ordinary circumstances of sudden changes of temperament, radical 
modification of living, of acts of great goodness or profound 
depravity. Beneath the placid monotony of daily living with its 
predictibility of behavior patterns there is a fluid uncertainty 
in the inner world, capable at any moment of spewing forth a 
radical act. 
Whereas classical psychology praised the rational and casti-
gated the passionate, Luther· sees the rational as itself ethi-
cally neutral. It is the servant of the passions. The conflict 
8Note how the passage cited in quotation 16, chapter 
Ill on page 66 refers to artistic gifts as divinely given. 
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is not between the rational and irrational, but within the 
irrational itself. God and evil have passionate fo~dations. 
For the good man the conflict goes on continually since he is 
never free in this lifetime of his lesser nature. But though he 
is not free, that is to say, rid of it, he need not thereby be in 
bondage to it. 
MOTIVATION AND ACTION 
Luther's conception of man, departing from the traditional 
view laid down by Aristotle, related to the Christian faith by 
Aquinas and adulterated by succeeding generations of Thomists and 
Ockhamites, required also a new approach to human action. Accord 
ing to the traditional approach man's character is formed under 
environmental influences by habituation. His primary ethical 
task is to develop good habits, by judicious use of reason (or by 
following the example of good guides), coupled with the gracious 
intervention of God in the formation of the spiritual virtues 
revealed and commanded by God. Virtue emerges by the doing of 
the good. 
For Luther, however, good habits--or good works--are not 
enough. One can reduce his outer life of action to a regulum. 
His inner life remains fluid and under tension. The fact that 
there are two moving forces independent of human control which 
intrude upon man's consciousness, stimulating him to action, one 
good and the other evil, requires that he give attention, not onl 
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to what he does--for his actions reinforce and shape the general 
pattern of his life and modify his external relati9J1ships:..-but 
also to determine what moves him. 
Since men are of two sorts, those whose motivation is 
satanic in origin and those who are moved by the divine, each 
sort has a different kind of ethical problem. The former are 
separated from the ontological source of their existence and are 
unable to achieve satisfaction with their lives because they lack 
the proper end. The latter are related to. their proper end and 
motivated by Him, but they are also subject to alien motivations. 
The latter need to sort out and to distinguish the divine from 
the demonic sources of motion in order not to act from demonic 
motivation. The ways that such sorting can occur can simply be 
exhibited by the following logical models. 
The investigation of the character of a given piece of inner 
experience, an impulse to act--together with its motivational 
source--follows the hypothetico-deductive method, the logical 
form of which is the hypothetical syllogism. The major premise 
contains the rationale of the investigation. The minor premise 
exhibits what is established by investigation. The conclusion, 
then, reveals what is entailed by that knowledge in the light of 
the rationale. There are four possible figures of the hypo-
thetical syllogism. We shall examine each in turn in the con-
text of the problem at issue to determine what can and cannot 
be learned about a given act and its motivation. 
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Take as true the following porpositions: "If a motivation is 
not divine it is demonic and vice-versa." and "If a9 action is 
divinely mot iva ted it is not contrary to the law of God." The 
former principle functions for the purpose of our model somewhat 
I 
like the principle of contradiction. We shall examine the four 
figures of the hypothetical syllogism in terms of divine moti-
vation. By application of the former principle above we could, 
simply, make the same determinations about demonic motivation. 
The second principle will serve as the major premise for 
each hypothetical syllogism. For simplicity's sake we shall 
symbolize it as: If M then not A, letting M=divine motivation and 
A=action contrary to the law of God. 
Self-analysis 
Figure I If M then not A. 
M 
therefore: not A. 
The minor premise indicates one sort of investiga~ion which 
one might undertake, to determine whether in a given piece of 
inner experience the impulse to act comes from God. If one can 
establish it, the conclusion follows from it and the major pre-
mise that the act is not contrary to the law of God. Since the 
-
problem of the examination is to determine what the motivation 
for the intended action is, the impulse to act must be traced to 
its source. If the source is God, then the action will not be 
contrary to the will of God and it can properly be done. It is 
no easy task. 
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One cannot simply take an objective stance toward oneself 
in order cooly and a~lytically to dissect one's ps~che. The 
movement to self-analysis is itself motivated. One has an 
attitude toward oneself, be it love or hate, which cannot but 
color the undertaking. Under the influence of personal emotion 
one is seldom a good judge of oneself. 
Human beings naturally are loathe to confront themselves. 
Ever since the first parents sought to hide themselves when they 
had done wrong, it has been easier to dissemble than to confront 
and exhibit oneself, even to oneself, whatever the.cause, shame, 
fear, uncertainty, in the cold light of reality. 
Psychology in the last fifty years has made us sensitive to 
unconscious motivation. The very word "unconscious" suggests 
the unknowability of certain levels of motivation. Hence, even 
when we are being quite honest with ourselves we may not always 
know the real source of our actions. Sometimes we have ulterior 
motives. Frequently we act on several levels of meaning which 
need to be sorted out and ranked. 
Because urges which lead to action are sufficiently powerful 
of themselves to result in action, it is easier to rationalize, 
i.e., create a self-satisfying rationale for the impulses, than 
to attempt to analyze its source prior to acting on it. Unless 
our impulses are personally revolting we tend to take them on 
faith and act on them. And, having acted on them, it is seldom 
difficult for us to convince ourselves that what we have done is 
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right, simply because we want to believe in our own good inten-
tions. Or perhaps the strength of the urge itself _persuades us 
of the rightness of the act. We feel so strongly about what we 
did that we could not be wrong. 
But let us suppose that these subjective problems are over-
come. Let us suppose that by careful reflection, introspection 
and examination one has gotten back to the foundations on which 
one's life rests, to what Luther calls one's 11god". 9 The crucial 
question now becomes "Is my god God?" Is it God that I love 
beyond all else? Is He my primary source of motivation? This is 
the ultimate Kierkegaardian question. Kierkegaard supposes that 
at this point one can be guided only by the purity and the 
singlemindedness of the emotion. 10 If the heart is pure, i.e., 
is honestly willing in all sincerity, then the action which 
ensues is also pure and proper. Luther's position argues that 
911A god means that from which we are to expect all good 
and to which we are to take refuge in all distress. So that to 
have a god is nothing else than to trust and believe him from 
the whole heart. As I have often said, the confidence and faith 
of the heart alone make both God and an idol. ••• That now, I 
say, upon which you set your heart and put your trust is properly 
your god." Luther's Large Catechism, Triglot Concordia, The 
Symbolical Books of the Ev. Lutheran Church, ed. F. Bente, St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921, pp. 580-581. Again, 
"••• to have a god is to have something in which the heart 
entirely trusts." .!.Qi9.., pp. 582-583. 
10
cf. Kierkegaard 1 s Purity Qf Heart is to Will One 
Thing. It is also a key question in contemporary religious 
situation ethics. 
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honesty is not enough. Since there are two possible sources of 
movement one can in all honesty serve Satan as well;as God. It 
makes a difference from which source the motivation comes. 
Purity of motivation can be understood in two senses. In 
the one sense, Kierkegaard 1 s, the purity is a characteristic of 
the relationship of the individual to the source of his moti-
vation. He relates faithfully to the source of his motivation, 
be it what it may. In the other sense, Luther's, purity refers 
to the source of the motivation, is it God or Satan? No amount 
of faithful drinking from a polluted stream can make it pure. 
Hence, the steadfastness and dedication of the individual to his 
source does not make unnecessary an examination of the source. 
How does one get at the source of one's motivation? Ulti-
rnately it becomes a process of negative dialectic, the systematic 
exclusion of sources which are not primary. One weighs the 
relative values of those things to which one gives oneself. That 
which is the object of primary trust, for the sake of which one 
is willing to give up all else, and on which one ultimately 
depends, is one's source. If it is anything or anyone but God 
it is satanic. How can one tell if one's god is God? By com-
paring it with God's expression of Himself as gospe1. 11 
11 See pages 77 and 78. 
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Comparison of ~ 
If M then not A. 
A 
Figure II / 
therefore: not M. 
The second figure of the hypothetical syllogism indicates 
that a second kind of investigation can be undertaken. The in-
tended act can be examined and compared with the. will of God to 
determine whether it is or is not contrary to that will. For if 
the act is contrary to the will of God, the motivation is not 
divine. If it is not divine, it is demonic and the act ought 
not be performed. 
The will of God is expressed by His law. 12 In his interpre-
tation of the ten commandments Luther claimed that the first 
commandment contains implicitly within. it all the commandments, 
for if one is loving God with his whole person the expression of 
that love fulfills the other nine. Hence, in his explanation of 
each of the commandments after the first he follows the following 
pattern: "We ought to be fearing and loving God so that we are 
not doing •••••••••• , but rather are doing • • • • • • • • • • .. 13 • Love 
for God entails love for one's fellowman. The latter is motivated 
by the former, or, as St. John said, one cannot claim to be loving 
God and at the same time be hating his brother. I John 3, 4:20. 
12
see pages 75, 76 and 77. 
13Luther 1 s Large Catechism, QQ. cit., pp. 581-677. For 
the formula see Luther's Small Catechism, £E• cit., pp. 539-543. 
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Certain sorts of actions, then, naturally follow if one is 
moved by God. Certain other sorts of action are inconsistent 
/ 
f G d If One is motivated by God the former will with love or o • 
occur spontaneously and the latter will not occur. 
Since, however, one is not always motivated by God, there is 
a diagnostic function for the law of God, to exhibit which sorts 
of actions are inconsistent with the will of God, since they 
14 follow on demonic motivation and cannot properly be done. 
Social Limitations 
Figure Ill If M then not A. 
Not M. 
therefore, A or not A.1 5 
The third figure exhibits the fact that a non-divine, i.e., 
demonic source of movement can consistently motivate to actions 
which qua acts, are the same as acts consistent with the law of 
God (e.g., one can be moved not to kill someone both by God and 
Satan.) or to actions which are opposed (one can be motivated by 
14
certain sorts of actions which are neither commanded 
nor forbidden by God are not contrary to the will of God. Be-
cause there are such actions and because they would appear to be 
prohibited if the consequent of the major premise above were 
stated in positive terms, it has been stated in the negative. 
15Figures Ill and IV are derived from the illicit 
figures of the hypothetical syllogism. The form of the syllogism 
is legitimate since the conclusion is tautological exhibiting in 
an alternation all possible conclusions. 
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Satan to steal). Because of this relationship between demonic 
motivation and action it is possible for pagans to ~ad outwardly 
good lives and for supposed people of God to be hypocrites. 16 
What of the motivation of persons other than oneself? 
According to Luther, none of us is privy to another's thoughts 
and feelings. 17 The problems attendant upon self-analysis are 
all present in the situation. In addition, since experiences are 
private, the data on the basis of which an observer of another 
arrives at an estimate of the other's motivation differ from 
those on the basis of which one arrives at one's own motivation. 
In the former case one is guided by the other's behavior, includ-
ing reports of his experience (which are unverifiable). In the 
latter case, one remembers his own experience to the best of his 
ability. He cannot both have an experience and be a spectator to 
it at the same time. He can get at it in a spectator sort of 
fashion only by memory. And even there, he is not spectator to 
himself having an experience in time past. He "relives" the. 
experience. 
16
secause of this dual direction of the demonic 
impulse, in social ethics a distinction has to be made between 
the worth of the action and the worth of the actor, and credit 
must be given--even as God does--to the goodness of the act apart 
from the character of the actor, even though the actor was not or 
is not motivated by God. This is the area of ethics to which 
Luther refers as civic righteousness. 
17He says, for instance, that the Spirit of God keeps 
the saints hidden so the wicked cannot see the glory of God. 
WA XVIII, p. 651. 
,f,' 
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There are some situations where it is necessary for one to 
attempt to assess the motivations of another: the clergyman hear-
/ 
ing confession, perhaps the psychiatrist, the judge or the paren 
Each of us has the tendency to want to pass judgment not only on 
the actions, but on the motives of others. What can one do? If 
one attempts to remain objective and impartial, keeping oneself 
uninvolved with the other, viewing the other as though one were 
constructing the other's conscious experience to view it as a 
spectator, one fails to achieve empathy. On the other hand, if 
one enters subjectively into a common effort at rapport to 
achieve maximum communication, one loses objectivity. One's own 
feelings and actions intrude upon the experience to color it. 
It is similar to attempting to study some form of wild life by 
taking up residence in the midst of it. One's presence pollutes 
the data. 
Luther offers a rule of thumb solution to the problem of 
evaluating others. Wherever possible don't evaluate the motives 
of others and where it is necessary to evaluate, put the best 
construction on what people do. 18 
18An interesting exhibition of Luther's approach is 
found in his discussion of sainthood in the De Servo Arbitrio. 
11 1 call them [those whom the church has identified as saints] 
saints and so regard them; 1 call them Church and so judge them--
but by the rule of charity not by the rule of faith. By which 1 
mean that charity which a hrays thinks the best of everyone and is 
not suspicious, but believes and assumes all good of its neigh-
bor--calls every baptized person a saint. There is no danger 
involved if she is wrong; it is the way of charity to be deceived 
for she is open to all the uses and abuses of ever man as bein 
---
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Hypocrisy 
If M then not A. 
Not A. 
Figure IV 
/ 
therefore, M or not M. 
The fourth and final figure exhibits the fact that the 
source of a motivation cannot be determined from the character of 
the act if the act itself is not contrary to the law of God. One 
cannot conclude that because the acts to which one is impelled 
are not contrary to the law of God, therefore, the impulses come 
from God; they might just as·well have a demonic source. In a 
peaceful, contented society during conventional times most im-
pulses tend toward actions consistent with those in agreement 
with the law of God. Because of the difficulty of self-exami-
nation (figure I) it is easy to content oneself with conventional 
conformity to the form of God's law, ignoring the conclusion of 
the fourth figure, that the motivation for such action can just 
as easily be demonic as divine. Hence, one can quite easily 
gradually slip from active involvment with God to quiet hypocrisy. 
In summary, then, two fruitful avenues of self-examination 
obtain, the first involving comparison of one's god with the 
handmaid of all, good and bad, believing and unbelieving, true 
and false. Faith, however, calls none a saint but him who is 
proclaimed such by divine sentence; for the way of faith is not 
to be deceived. Therefore, though we should look on each other 
as saints as a matter of charity, none should be declared a saint 
as a matter of faith, as if it were an article of faith that so 
and so is a saint." .!.£M., pp. 651-652. Bracketed material mine. 
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gospel revelation of God; the second involving the testing of our 
actions by the law revelation of God. The former examination is 
/ 
positive and, if successful, can result in proper activity. The 
latter is negative and ought to result in resistance to the 
impulse. If the source of movement is demonic, the resultant 
actions themselves may be good or evil qua action. Finally, the 
goodness of the source of motivation cannot be determined from 
the goodness of the act. If one limits his consideration of good 
and evil to actions he cannot separate divine from demonic 
activity. 
In conclusion, while on the ontological level the divine/hu-
man relationship is impersonal as God relates Himself indirectly 
to men through His ontological operation of the universe and move~ 
them as part of His overall creative plan, on the other two 
levels--and at the same time--there is a personal relationship. 
For God approaches men individually from within on the manichaean 
level and confronts them with Himself that He might move them on 
the existential level to activity. Hence, there occurs on 
different levels at the same time a transcendent relationship and 
an immanent association; an outer encounter and an inner rapport; 
a duality of difference and a community of operation. 
If good is whatever happens when God moves, a great deal of 
what passes our notice in everyday life, the common ordinary 
tasks of workaday living, are ethically valuable. Unlike many 
ethics, Luther's is not an ethics of crisis, involving agonizing 
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deliberations over crucial decisions. But then, life is not like 
that for the most of us anyway. As Kierkegaard one~ pointed out, 
/ 
the 11knight of faith 11 looks like an ordinary tax collector. 19 
This is not to say that men of God are never called upon to make 
difficult decisions. Some have been rulers. Some have been 
martyrs. But rulers and martyrs have seldom constituted a 
majority of the population of the world. To construe Christian 
ethics in crisis terms, then, is to overdramatize and to general-
ize the experiences of a few exciting hist~rical personages as 
typical of the Christian calling and to mislocate the ethical 
arena of the human heart in the external world of human affairs. 
The latter arena is always more sensational. In the long light 
of eternity, though, it may well be considerably less significan~ 
19 In ~ and Trembling 
CHAPTER V 
MOTIVATION AND LIFE--THE DIRECTION Qf LUTHER'S ETHIC 
Roughly speaking, an action has four aspects which more or 
less clearly can be distinguished: the end in view, i.e., the 
object of the action, the motivation, the act itself and the 
emotion or condition of mind 't-7hich accompanies the act or ensues 
upon its completion. A typical ethical approach has developed 
centering around each of the·se parts and ba.sing itself upon it 
as primary. 
Teleological ethical approaches are based upon the consid-
eration of ends or objects of action. The basic question 
teleologists attempt to answer is: what is worth achieving by 
human action? The question may get phrased in different sorts of 
ways, e.g., What is man's proper end? or What is good in itself? 
or Hhat things or thing have or has intrinsic value? The succes 
ful answering of the first question gives rise to a natural 
second question: How can that which is worth achieving be 
achieved? \-lhereas the former question concerned itself with the 
end of existence, the latter concerns itself with means to that 
end: what sort or sorts of hehavior will bring about the worth-
while state of affairs? 1 
1I have in mind as examples of teleological ethics, 
Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics and G. E. Moore's Principia 
Ethica. I cite these examples with great hesitancy since no 
instance can be e uated with a t e of a roach 
---
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While teleological ethical systems may vary in their con-
tent, depending on what is taken to be good or valuable, they 
/ 
share a common agreement that ethics concerns itself properly 
with determining the sort of life necessary to bring into being 
and to preserve that which is most worthwhile. The sorts of 
lives recommended by the differing systems depend upon the ends 
espoused; for as soon as the ends are determined, the determi-
nation of what sort of life is right follows with little diffi-
culty: that life which will realize those ends. Different ends 
require different kinds of lives. Therefore, ends determine 
actions and ethics properly begins its consideration with ends 
men entertain as worthwhile. 
The deontological ethical approach by way of contrast, bases 
its considerations on actions themselves irrespective of ends. 
The basic concept is "right" rather than "good". Certain sorts 
of actions are right whereas others are wrong or ethic~lly 
indifferent. The ethical life is defined as living rightly. 
The task of the ethicist according to this approach is to arrive 
at maxims of action which in some way or other can be authenti-
cated as right, to formulate law-like propositions holding for all 
-
of mankind, organized into a canon of ethical prescription. The 
goal of the ethicist is to arrive at principles for formulating 
or testing the rightness of actions and to develop practical 
procedures for determining the appropriate performance of 
possible permissible acts which ought to be performed in specific 
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situations. 
ought I do? 2 
There is only one basic ethical question: What 
/ 
/ 
A third kind of approach focuses on the concomitant of 
action, the emotion which is attendant upon it or, more broadly, 
the condition of mind which ensues upon the action, to which the 
action is intended to give rise. While there are certainly other 
alternatives, in the history of philosophy two varieties of this 
kind of ethic have developed, hedonism, both egoistic and altru-
istic, and utilitarianism, or the greatest happiness principle. 3 
This third kind of approach begins with the rather obvious point 
that people have likes and dislikes. The function of ethics then 
is to achieve a state of affairs which the actor himself, or as 
many people as possible, will like. A simple ethical system of 
this sort in one way or another canvasses the likes and dislikes 
of mankind (or however large a segment of mankind the ethicist 
considers significant) and proposes a system whereby likes and 
dislikes can be quantified. This achieved, the ethical agent 
needs simply to determine what action will maximize the likeable 
and minimize the dislikeable results of his behavior and to 
21 have Kant particularly in mind as an example of 
deontology. Cf. his Critique of. Practical Reason 
3Epicurus is the standard of hedonism. The utili-
tarians of the last century were notably, Bentham and the Mills, 
James and John Stuart. Cf. particularly the latter's 
Uti 1 ita ria n ism. 
" 
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perform that act. 
More sophisticated ethicists, recognizing the fact that 
/ 
people disagree in their likes and dislikes, attempt to develop 
principles for the ranking of likeables and dislikeables, since 
some things liked are more worth liking than others. Such an 
ethicist undertakes a double task: not simply to provide a 
mathematical formula whereby the most appropriate actions can be 
calculated, but also to convince his clientele that certain 
things are more worth liking than others, or that the things 
which certain persons like are worth more than those liked by 
others. 
Finally, there is a fourth approach to ethics, the moti-
vational approach, which Luther espoused. It focuses upon what 
moves the actor to do what he does. The rightness or wrongness 
of the actor's action is determined by the motive which gives 
rise to the act. The intent of the ethic is to produce actions 
arising from pure motives. Rather than asking what ought to be 
done or achieved, the motivational ethicist attempts to develop 
a procedure for self-examination and a method for evaluating 
motives. 4 
4Abelard comes first to mind as a voluntarist. See his 
Scito ~ Ipsum; then also Kierkegaard, various writings, but par-
ticularly Purity of Heart is !2 ~ One Thing. The influence of 
existentialism has been widespread and has produced a whole host 
of voluntarists, notably in psychology, philosophy and theology. 
Note, for instance, Rollo May, Freud and the freudian school by 
way of Nietzsche's philosophy, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel, Barth 
.and Tillich to mention ·ust a few. 
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Each of these four approaches to ethics, thus, develop its 
own peculiar pattern and structure. Each has its separate vision 
of a perfect ethical world. The telic vision contemplates a 
world of goodness and moderation; the deontic seer visualizes a 
world order brought into being by law-abiding people living 
peaceably with one another in mutual respect for la"V7 and author-
ity; the hedonic view projects a host of happy untroubled people; 
while the voluntarist anticipates a straightforward and honest 
world where men communicate with one another in purity of heart 
without deception or deceit. 
Certainly it would be interesting and profitable to pursue 
further and in greater detail the contrasts be~een these general 
approaches to ethics, but the concern of this book is to exhibit 
the unique type of motivational ethics which Luther developed. 
As soon as he began with the concept of liberum arbitrium 
as an attribute peculiar to God the foundations for Luther's 
ethics began to be laid. When he conceived of ultimate human 
reality as subjective forces shaping the human psyche and con-
fronting it in inner experience, inevitably metaphysical quest-
ions led to theological and psychological questions. These 
questions, for a complete explanation of human behavior, led to 
an examination not only of the role of super-human formative 
agencies, but also of the human response to them, i.e., to the 
subject of ethics. Since the area of ethical experience for 
Luther is the inner life, that place -v1here the human encounters 
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the divine and the demonic immediately, the ethics is moti-
vational. 
The problem which Luther poses in this chapter for the 
author is some"-1hat different, and considerably more difficult 
than that in previous chapters. For while in chapters two and 
three the problem of Luther the philosopher was to organize in 
systematic fashion the metaphysical position he espoused, a 
position worked out and expressed by Luther, but in random rather 
than organized form, here the problem is to develop the ethical 
direction entailed by Luther's metaphysical position, an ethical 
direction which he himself did not work out, although in his 
'\vritings of an ethical character he assumed it. 
In his works the philosophic materials available are the 
fragments of a thought-out metaphysic, the rudiments of a psychol-
ogy, and a multitude of practical ~axims with supporting argu~ 
ments. The ethical rationale which fills the gap between the psy-
chology and the ro~xims is missing, remaining to be explicitly 
deduced from the psychology and the metaphysics. Thus, when we 
talk of Luther's ethic in this chapter '\ve refer and can refer only 
to that which needed to be rendered explicit to complete the 
philosophic structure of his.thought and to give foundation and 
significance to his particular statements on ethical topics. 
Lacking, then, an explicit Lutheran ethical system, we have 
attempted only the propaedeutic to it by using the three con-
trasting approaches to ethics as foils to exhibit how the 
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structure of Luther's ethics differs from them and the rationale 
which underlies that difference. In this fashion certain basic 
principles for a Lutheran ethic can be isolated. Each of these 
oppositions is epitomized by a concept central to Luther's 
thought, which gives direction and focus to his ethical position. 
Thus, at least a foundation is laid for the development of an 
explicit Lutheran ethic which, whatever its content, can remain 
5 true to the formal structure of Luther's thought. 
THE ANTI-HEDONIC PRINCIPLE 
Hedonic and associated approaches to ethics lack what in 
Luther's metaphysic has been identified as an ontological level 
of meaning. The foundation of meaning and value, understandably 
then, in hedonic ethics is manichaean, a dichotomy of opposed 
ethically significant inner experiences: pleasure and pct:in. 
These function as the ultimate values. The existential level of 
5 In what follows I have attempted to reduce the 
rationale of each of the contrasting ethical approaches to a 
principle set into opposition to Luther's position. This sort of 
approach carries with it certain dangers. Inevitably it is 
simplicistic, failing to come to grips with the various subtleti$ 
and sophistications which only the careful analysis of a partic-
ular fully developed ethical system can hope to achieve. And yet, 
often it is only when we see a structure from a distance, when 
the various particularities blend into a simple and unified whole, 
that we are able to see its basic dissimilarity to another 
structure which in many details it resembles. Since the concern 
of the chapter is to clarify the distinctive difference of 
Luther's ethical approach, this emphasis on basic difference in 
principle lends itself well to the undertaking. 
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conscious human activity is devoted to calculation, the weighing 
of probable pleasures and pains involved in alterna~ive courses 
/ 
of action in the pursuit of the elusive elixir, happiness. 
The Good and the Pleasant 
Luther's ethical approach is incompatible with the hedonic 
primarily for material reasons. The hedonic approach ultimately 
reduces the good to the pleasant, but for Luther anidentity of 
the good and the pleasant is achieved only by the free activity 
of God. Ideally a completely good life ought to be a completely 
pleasant life. Hence, for a hedonist to say that the good life 
is pleasant is either to utter a proposition which is true by 
definition (ostensively true, perhaps) or to use language in some 
non-assertive fashion, for the linguistic utterance, though 
apparently synthetic, is for him actually a tautology. 
For Luther, on the other hand, such a remark is a factual 
type statement about experience which may or may not be true, 
depending on what is meant by the term "pleasant". For instance, 
if the remark means that the good life is one in which one can 
take pleasure, or from which one can derive pleasure, then it is 
true. If it means that the good life invariably is accompanied 
by feelings of pleasure then, as a generalization it is false. 
The demonic interference with the ontological operation of the 
universe causes the association of good and pleasure on the 
existential level always to be contingent. 
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The Value of Pleasure and Pain 
For Luther pleasure and pain arise from both divine and 
demonic sources. Since both demonic and divine influences give 
rise to the pleasures and pains we experience one cannot simply 
accept pain as evil and pleasure as good. Pleasure is completely 
unreliable as a moral criterion. One can take a fiendish or a 
saintly pleasure in certain events. The expected pleasure in a 
possible experience can delude us into doing wrong. The joy of 
naughtiness is often its mos·t formidable source of attractive-
ness. 
Pain, on the other hand, is a consistent guide, for pain is 
ah-1ays evidence of something wrong. Insofar as pain is an indi-
cator of something wrong in the situation, it is ethically good 
and practically valuable. But it does not follow from the fact 
that pain is good that it is good to be in pain. This is false 
conversion. 
One can be pained under two conditions, either because there 
is so~~thing evil about the situation with which one, a good man, 
is involved, or because one himself is, at least for the moment, 
evilly motivated. A situation or a contemplated course of action 
cannot be identified as evil simply because one is pained by it; 
one can, however, with surety conclude that evil is involved in 
the situation when pain is experienced. Whether the evil be in 
the actor, the situation or the act--some or all of them--is not 
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discoverable from the feeling of pain. 
Relation of the Inner and the Outer Life 
-- --- --- --- ----
Luther's ethic is also incompatible with an hedonic ethic 
because the hedonic ethic subordinates the outer life to the 
inner. A hedonist acts for the sake of the pleasure which 
attends and results from the action. The act is for the sake of 
the feelings which arise from it. In Luther's ethic the outer 
life is the expression of the inner life. Neither is for the 
sake of the other. Hence, Luther's ethic is outgoing rather than 
introverted. 
Happiness 
The conflict of Luther with the hedonic approa·ch is epito-
mized by the role of happiness in their ethics. Whereas hedonism 
arrives at happiness as the goal of existence, Luther's ethic 
begins with happiness. Mankind began in the happiness of Eden. 
Conversion returns a man to that happy pristine psychic condition 
Happiness, for Luther, is the pleasure of God's acquaintance, a 
psychic activity which originates temporally although it tran-
scends the temporal in its duration. 
If then, happiness is the original natural activity of 
man--and therefore good--and if by conversion, God returns that 
lost condition to a man, then, the hedonic problem of the man of 
God is not, as the hedonist views it, to achieve happiness, but 
rather, to avoid losing it. The good life is the retention of 
happiness, not the means of attaining it. 
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Happiness which begins as a gift of God is sustained and 
renewed through the cathartic action of self-examination by the 
law of God, repentance, and the practice of the sacraments. When 
the motivational impulses from God are, thus, freed from the 
demonic and strengthened, what then occurs as a natural course 
will by its very nature be good and pleasing both to God and to 
oneself. Hence, the anti-hedonic principle of Luther's ethic is: 
The function of the ethical life is to retain, not to attain 
happiness. 
THE ANTI-TELIC PRINCIPLE 
Teleological approaches to ethics tend not to develop a 
manichaean level of meaning since they need only an ontological 
level of value and an existential level of action. The onto-
logical concern is expressed by the question: What is good in 
itself? or What is worth existing? The concern is satisfied by 
the development of a summum bonum or a constellation of goods. 
Once goods have been determined there remains only the practical 
problem of discovering what sorts of habits need to be engendered 
or what sort of way of life needsto be pursued in order to 
achieve and retain the good. No dialectical or limiting level is 
necessary in order to complete the system. Failure to achieve 
the good can be explained either in terms of ignorance or weak-
ness of will. 
Luther's approach to ethics is inconsistent with a teleo-
logical approach primarily for formal reasons, differing on the 
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source of the goodness of a life. Teleology assumes that a life' 
good is determined by its end or ends, in contrast to Luther who 
traces its good to life's beginnings, the motivations for its 
actions. 
Differin_g f_sychologi.es 
The basis for this disagreement may lie in the differing 
psychologies of action assumed by the two approaches. A telic 
type of ethics works with a psychology which assumes that objects 
thought or perceived, function as final causes for agents, moving 
them to action. Repetition of action produces habit. The 
peculiar shape or character a life has is determined by its habit 
patterns. Hence, it is the end or ends of action vrhich finally 
determine the character of the life, whether good or not. 
In Luther's psychology, on the other hand, an impulse to 
action rises to consciousness, clothed with meaning and achieving 
the possibility of overt expression by focusing upon some object, 
appropriate to the situation or not, as an urge to act. It may 
or may not find expression, depending on the self-control of the 
actor and the options available to him to expend his energies 
productively. Since the impulse may arise from a divine or a 
demonic source and focus upon the same end, it is not the end, 
but the source of the impulse which determines what is done. 
Since a life is the totality of what is done, the sources of 
motivation determine whether the life is good or not. It is not 
what a man has in mind that makes him what he is, but what comes 
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from his heart. 
The Actor and His Good 
In contrast to the criticism of hedonism for subordinating 
the outer life to the inner, Luther's criticism of a teleological 
approach would tend to be that it subordinates the inner life to 
the outer. It externalizes the good. The good becomes that at 
which a thing aims. If the thing aims at the good,tl~good must 
then be external to the thing and is aimed at by the·ethical act. 
The agent, then, in his life comes no closer to the good, except 
perchance, than external conventional behavior. His actions con-
form to the good. 
Because the telic approach to ethics inevitably tends to 
emphasize the primacy of the outer life, since it is action that 
achieves the good, the approach tends inevitably to be social in 
character. Hence, it tends to assume that man is by nature a 
social animal and to develop i.ts approach on the basis of that 
postulate. Problems of the inner life are simply disturbances 
which in one fashion or another can be overcome or avoided by 
good habits. 
In contrast, Luther's approach to ethics emphasizes the 
importance of the inner life in giving shape and character to the 
outer life. What makes an act truly ethical is the commitment of 
the agent to his act. Habitual behavior is at best conventional~ 
good. The spontaneity, the vitality, the immediacy and the per-
sonal devotion to what one does gives actions their particular 
109 
character and value. The ethical agent does not gather values 
from the world about him or rearrange them but rather contributes 
value to the v1or ld. 
There is a sort of aesthetic aura about the ethical for 
Luther. To be ethical is to be creative, to focus one's spir-
itual energies upon a moment of time to infuse it with goodness. 
Actions are good because God is acting through men to perform 
them. A teleological approach inevitably must construe the 
ethical effort as bringing good into being. in fact where before 
it existed only in idea (the classical shift from the ideal to 
the real with all its attendant problems). For Luther good is 
there to begin with, God, who impels the individual to action. 
Thus, there is no subordination of the inner to the outer but 
a co-ordination of the two as good impulses give rise to good 
actions. 
Eternal Life 
The end of the man of God is eternal life. For Luther it 
exists from the beginning of the ethical life. St. John, 
this expression "eternal life" as a technical expression, 
> / 
using 
/ 1)(0') 
~LtJVlO~ defines it as "knowing Thee the only true God and Jesus 
6 Christ Hhom Thou hast sent," an activity which under present 
conditions is mediated by the Hord of God in the expectation of a 
6 . John 17.3. 
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future immediate relationship of knm~ing and being known. Hence, 
eternal life has both a present and a future significance for the 
ethical life and constitutes the final form this present life 
will take. 
Since, then, the ethical life begins as an eternal life 
aimed at a greater fulness of that life, the primary concern of 
the man of God is two-fold, first, not to lose the life, now that 
he has it, and secondly, to enrich it, that is, to draw closer to 
the final goal, the perfect knowledge of God. How does one attcl~ 
a more intimate knowing of God? 
God is a person. Hence, a rather simple answer to the 
question is that one gets to know God better in the same way that 
one gets to know any person. There are two problems with getting 
to know God better which do not arise with getting to know people 
better. We cannot achieve a more intimate knowledge of God by 
means of His body since He lacks a body. We do, however, possess 
the gospel, the record of His incarnation, and His physical 
sacramental presence and by means of these can more intimately 
know Him. 
Secondly, we are presently limited to a mediated knowledge 
of Him. At the same time our knowledge of other persons is 
limited by their capacity to reveal themselves, and by ours to be 
sensitive to their revelations. Such personal revelations, how-
ever, are always temporally direct or reasonably direct, whereas 
the revelation of Himself to us by God is always mediated 
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historically by His \.Jord, our primary source of Divine knowledge. 
Even when we have reason to believe that we have evidence of God 
expressing Himself immediately to us (e.g., when deciding whether 
a given psychic impulse is of divine origin) such evidence is 
tested for consistency against the historical expression of God 
as gospel. Otherwise we open ourselves to delusion by the 
demonic. 
Given then, the primary source of the knowledge of God, we 
gain further intimacy with God by speaking to Him and by sen-
sitivity to Him in the ideas and impulses which rise to our 
consciousness from Hima secondly, we gain in intimacy with God 
through sensitivity to His activity in the lives of others 
through whom He speaks and acts. Finally, we observe the traces 
of His activity in the ongoing economy of nature and the course 
of world history. 7 Each of these forms of evidence, however, is 
limited by the fact that our knowing of God is mediated by His 
effects. We confront Him indirectly. 8 
The danger of losing eternal life is to a degree diminished 
by increasing its intimacy. The qualification is added for this 
reason. Even though intimacy with God may increase, demonic 
7
r have previously identified these sources of know-
ledge about God as "the action of God as gospel" in chapter IV, 
pp. 77 and 78. 
8
rn spite of centuries of Luther research comprising a 
great volume of material, these vital areas remain relatively 
unexplored: the mystical side of Luther's thought, Luther's 
natural theology, Luther's psychology and sociology. 
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impulses neither cease nor lose their strength so long as the 
present conditions of existence continue. In fact, such impulses 
/ 
may very well gain in strength. Conseqll;ently, a life of exist-
ence with God is always accompanied by temptation. The manichae~ 
level of existence does not cease to be a factor. Consequently, 
the need for renewal of spirituality remains constant, lest life 
lapse back into control by the demonic. 
There seems to be some relationship between the strength of 
the divine and the demonic. Perhaps becau~e it takes a great 
deal of strength on the part of God to overcome a powerfully 
demonic drive in an individual, when conversion occurs and the 
individual is changed from obedience to the demonic to the divine, 
a manifest evildoer sometimes becomes a saint. Or perhaps be-
cause it takes a very talented person to be a master criminal, 
when those same talents are devoted to better things, the same 
outstanding behavior, but of a better sort, occurs. 
Again, if the divine impulses determining the volitions of a 
person increase in strength, the demonic must also increase to 
continue to be a temptation. Consequently, when the temptation 
succeeds it may result upon occasion in actions which are gross 
and violent, exhibiting the nature and intensity of the impulses 
which had previously been resisted. 
The dual side of the ethical life of the sinner/saint 
exhibits itself, a life both eternal in its character and demonic 
in the temptations which beset it. To construe eternal life in a 
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telic fashion is to see life as action for the sake of an eternal 
life which awaits the successful completion of the proper course 
of actions. The end awaits the termination of the means and is 
divorced temporally from its beginning. To see it· as Luther sees 
it is rather to view eternal life as beginning in this life and 
continuing developmentally in a process of fulfillment, expres-
sing itself by actions peculiar to that kind of life, actions, 
that is, which are not the means to it, but its products and 
reinforcements. If that life does not begin in this present life 
it will not begin in any life to come, for actions do not cause 
it to be; rather, the actions occur in the fashion and frequency 
that they do because the life already is. Hence, the anti-telic 
principle of Luther is: The goodness of life follows from its 
inner motivation rather than from the end at which it aims. 
THE ANTI-DEONTIC PRINCIPLE 
The deontic approach to ethics appears to contain all three 
levels of meaning found in Luther's philosophy. It contains an 
ontological level which may be developed in a metaphysical form 
e.g., a notion of a universe operating according to natural 
principles of justice, as th~ expression of a social ideal e.g., 
Kant's kingdom of ends, or perhaps, the idea of a theodicy, as in 
Calvin's divine kingdom or that of the latter day Mormons. The 
element common to each of the views is the attempt to reduce the 
ethical demands of life to a set or canon of prescriptions or a 
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body of duties which have in some sense or another universal 
validity. Since the approach aims at universality, the rules or 
laws which are prescribed of necessity must rest on some sort of 
absolute or ultimate principle or be testable by some logical 
principle or device, e.g., the principle of self-consistency, of 
contradiction, etc. 
The ontological level tends not to be the source of value, 
so much as the context in which the ethical life occurs and which 
makes it or its product possible. Hence, it functions more to 
provide the setting, the precondition of ethical behavior rather 
than the conditions or prescriptions. Because of this charac-
teristic of the deontological ontological level, it is possible 
to talk in terms of what would be "right" for any possible 
world--a kind of remark which would tend to make little or no 
sense to a hedonist or teleologist. Some systems exhibit the 
ontology as a desirable outcome, a wished for dream which makes 
the devotion to duty worth all the trouble. 9 This is a hedonic 
slip which mars the perfection of the approach. 
In contrast to the teleological approach, the deontic 
approach also requires a manichaean level. Since the aim of the 
ethical law is universal rightness, its natural enemy is 
9 One may properly ask, for instance, to what extent 
Kant's "kingdom of ends" and the "idea of perpetual peace" serve 
as unconscious substitutionary motivations for duty in Kant's 
ethics. 
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individuality, the moral exception. Converted to terms of human 
psychology, the deontic manichaean dialectic is between ration-
ality, the principle of universality in mind, and inclination, 
the attachment to the particular. The existential level of 
ethical action, then, according to the deontic approach, occurs 
in the overcoming of inclination by respect for law. Duty 
triumphs over personal desire. Men hold themselves in restraint 
in obedience to the higher laws of reason. 
Because the deontic approach apparently contains all three 
of Luther's levels of meanings, Lutheran theologians and ethical 
philosophers often, beginning with the Leibnizian-Wolffian-
Kantian tradition, have attempted to structure the Lutheran 
ethical outlook according to a deontic· approach. The result 
inevitably is legalism, a self-frustrating pseudo-religious 
ethic,10 for it is impossible to get a natural existential level 
of practical action. 
Universality and Subjectivity 
The deontic approach suffers from psychological difficultie~ 
for the dialectic of the universal versus the personal is re-
solved by the suppression of the personal and its subsumption to 
the universal. The dialectic--in Kant, for instance, as Hegel 
pointed out--is not resolved into a unified existential level of 
lOTh · 1 f h. f h i f d e prLme examp e o t 1s sort o approac s oun 
in Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. 
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action. Frustration occurs. One acts at the expense of the 
frustrations of one's natural inclinations. The ethical actor 
has to deny himself for the sake of duty. While this may appear 
ethically praiseworthy, it is psychically damaging. 
Since action flows naturally from inclination--we follow our 
natural bents--the deontic life must, of necessity proceed from 
an unnatural devotion to duty. Artifical springs to action must 
be developed out of the frustration of the natural springs to 
action. There is no other possible source.of motility. Hence, 
from a purely psychological standpoint, either no existential 
level of action can arise from the manichaean dialectic of inner 
experience or an unnatural drive arises out of the trauma of 
self-frustration. 
Luther's ethical approach differs from the deontic, then, 
primarily on grounds of efficiency. The deontic approach does 
not get the ethical job done. It has no natural existential 
level. In the effort to reduce the ethical life of obedience to 
law, the deontic approach discounts and destroys the personal 
and the individual. The deontologist aims at a life of con-
formity to rational rules. He focuses on the act and, hence, 
ignores the actor; gains objectivity at the expense of sub-
jectivity, the norm at the expense of the individual difference, 
the proper at the expense of the natural and the "ought" at the 
expense of the "is". Something gets frustrated or lost in the 
process. 
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The ethical man is depersonalized. He is not free to be a 
person so long as he is bound to a prescribed life. He can only 
be a kind of person, a stereotype. Thus, the deontic ethic is a 
form of servitude. The very language of this kind of ethics 
exhibits the fact. One has obligations, things to which he is 
tied. He ought i.e., mves, to do this or that. He has duties, 
i.e., there are necessary actions he must perform. Each of these 
betokens a limitation placed upon the individua 1' s freedom to 
act. Since the deontic approach attempts to define ethical 
behavior as obedience to law, unique behavior is inimical to that 
sort of approach. 
For Luther actions which are truly ethical flow from the 
inclinations of a man committed to the service of God. They are 
freely done, often without thinking. Acts flow spontaneously 
from a pure heart. Only when actions flmv from divine motivation 
do they have ethical value. Otherwise they are hypocritical or 
forced. 
Prescription Versus Diagnosis 
For Luther law has an ethical function in personal ethics, 
but its function is diagnostic rather than prescriptive. The 
mistake of the deontic approa-ch is to give la,., a positive 
function. As soon as life is prescribed it loses its spontaneity, 
its creativity, and its vitality. Only when the bondage of the 
will to law is removed are n~n capable of free ethical behavior. 
Since duty and inclination are incompatible in the deontic 
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approach, there is an inevitable divorce between the inner and 
the outer life, between motivation and action. One can act 
rightly for ulterior motives and lead a life of hypocrisy. One 
can be a conformist with little or no commitment to vThat he does 
• 
or professes. One can, burdened by a sensitive conscience, be-
come immobilized by the tension bet~-1een what he wants to do and 
what he feels he ought to do, perhaps breaking down ultimately 
under the unbearable strain of being put in opposition to himself. 
The natural flow of energy is from the ontological to the 
manichaean to the existential level. In the deontic approach, 
however, this is the direction of the flow of inclination and 
there is counter-posed to it a movement from the existential--
awareness of the rightness of the act-~to the manichaean--de-
votion to duty rather than inclination. The counter-posed forces 
meet in the inner life and an irreconcilible conflict is the 
result. 
Love Versus Duty 
While a deontic approach, having rejected natural impulses 
to action as ethically unworthy, must create a new motivation for 
action, duty; in Luther's approach the problem with inclination 
is not that it is evil, but rather that some impulses are evil 
and others are not. Hence, if one acts from good impulses, good 
actions naturally result. No conflict of an individual with him-
self or any frustration of himself for the sake of principle 
need occur. Rather, he can freely express himself in a quite 
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natural and uninhibited fashion so long as his motivation is goo 
Luther agrees with the deontic approach that the goodness or 
evil of a will is determined by its motivation but he disagrees 
with the approach when it proposes a respect for duty as the 
motivation, proposing instead, the love of God. 11 His anti-
deontic principle is: Love of God, not duty, is the motivation 
for the good life. 
The expression "love of God" is deliberately ambiguous. 
What is meant by it is both ""God loving" [the objective genitive 
sense of the expression, denoting ontological activity] and 
"loving God" [the subjective genitive sense, denoting existentia 1 
activity]. Love is the spring to the ethical act. Whatever 
flows from it is good. It is natural in that it springs spon-
taneously into consciousness in the urge to act and moves 
through conscious deliberation to some form or forms of overt 
behavior. The direction of the motivation is to return back to 
God, but since God cannot be affected by action, the impulse is 
informed on behalf of God in particular ways toward individual 
persons or states of affairs. 
Luther's dialectic does not consist in the conflict between 
the rational and the passionate, but between divine and demonic 
impulses. Whichever gains the ascendency is freely accepted and 
11 The momumental study of love, agape, is Anders 
Nygren's Agape and Eros, translated by Philip s. Watson, Phila-
delphia: Westminster Press, 1953. See especially chapter six of 
Part II. 
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followed. The problem of generating a motive to act, a key 
problem in deontology, never arises. Rational capacities are 
ethically neutral, functioning prudentially for both criminal and 
saint. They can be used in ancillary fashion to work out the 
details for the successful achievement of a desired goal or in 
reflexive fashion to analyze or evaluate oneself. But they can-
not stand in opposition to the passionate nature since they have 
no volitional powers to increase the tension of the situation. 
Subjectivity 
Whereas the deontic approach emphasizes universality and 
objectivity, the approach of Luther emphasizes individuality and 
subjectivity. Hence, the final concept which is of primary 
importance in Luther's ethical approach emphasizes the uniqueness 
of the ethical life. It is worked out alone by each individual. 
He is responsible for himself. Noone can assume responsibility 
before God for him. Since the ethical life is worked out in the 
inner life, exhibiting its presence by outward action, it is of 
necessity private. Although one can reveal hi~mself to a degree 
to others and solicit their comfort and advice, one is ultimately 
alone with himself and his God. Only he experiences his feelings 
and thinks his thoughts. For this reason Luther argued against 
judging one another as persons and as ethical beings. One cannot 
know with certainty another's motivations. One cannot know the 
ultimate commitment of another or whether his untoward act repre-
sents a yielding to temptation or not. Since, then, it is the 
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mark of charity to err on the side of the good, one must put the 
best construction on the actions of others. 
Luther's ethical view is essentially reconciliatory. He 
sees the universe as originally ontological and existential. 
Because of the emergence of the manichaean level the opposing 
forces must be brought into harmony once again. The divine 
function which in the former ontologico-existential relationship 
was purely creative must also be reconstructive that the sepa-
ration between the ontological and the existential is bridged. 
That gap can be closed if a coincidence of the existential life 
with the ontological activity of God is achieved by the neutrali-
zation of the motivating influence of the demonic in the inner 
life. The reconciliation occurs only where God and men become 
attached to one another by bonds of affection and understanding. 
Hence, the prerequisite for the ethical life is to know God, to 
love Him, and to take pleasure in that activity. A hedonic 
approach leads to idolatry for it deifies a feeling. A telic 
approach lacks the vitality of the relationship with God. A 
deontic approach inevitably turns man against himself. Only an 
ethelic approach is left. Luther argues that this approach can 
resolve the problem of human-existence, but only if that which 
is desired is the source of the desiring, if the final cause of 
human existence is also its first cause. God is both the Alpha 
and the Omega of existence. If activity is to be ethical, it 
must find its origin in God, feel His promptings in the inner 
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life and naturally make its unique way through the particu-
larities of the outer life back to God from Whom it came. 
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